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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : Case No. 20050676-SC 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant is charged with three counts of murder, a first degree felony. This Court 
granted defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal from pretrial orders denying his motions 
to suppress his confession and to dismiss for destruction of evidence. This Court has 
appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress his 
confession where police used no coercive tactics, defendant appeared to be sober and lucid, 
and defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to silence? 
Standard of Review: A bifurcated standard of review applies to a trial court's 
determination of the voluntariness of a confession. State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f 10, 
984 P.2d 1009. "The ultimate determination of voluntariness is a legal question," which is 
reviewed "for correctness." Id But a district court's factual findings are set aside "only if 
they are clearly erroneous." Id, 
Issue No. 2: Were defendant's due process rights violated by the destruction of 
physical evidence, where defendant has not shown that the police acted in bad faith in 
destroying the evidence and where other ample evidence in the form of eyewitnesses and 
written reports remains? 
Standard of Review: u[W]hether specific police conduct rises to the level of bad faith 
is a question of law, reviewed under a correctness standard." State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 
324 (Utah App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions are reproduced in Addendum A: U.S. Const, 
amends. V, VI, & XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In November 1991, defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated murder, a 
capital offense, and one count each of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated kidnapping, 
and aggravated sexual assault, first degree felonies. R477. The charges were dismissed 
seven months later, on June 11, 1992, after alienists concluded that defendant was 
incompetent to stand trial and would remain so "in the foreseeable future." R636:13; R531 -
33. Defendant was civilly committed to the Utah State Hospital. R636:18. A doctor at the 
State Hospital later opined that defendant would never become competent or be able to assist 
in his defense. R636:15. 
2 
In April 1994, the evidence custodian notified the investigating officer that physical 
evidence taken from defendant's person and from the crime scene would be destroyed, unless 
an objection were lodged within 30 days. See Supplemental Record (Addendum B). No 
objection was made and two revolvers were destroyed eight months later on December 16, 
1994. Id. However, according to the West Valley Police Property Tracking Tags, several 
other items had already been destroyed on February 22, 1994, including a Code R kit, a 
victim's wallet, heroin, an audio tape, a blood specimen, a make-up kit, drug paraphernalia, 
various articles of the victims' clothing, bedding, a bone fragment found on one victim's bed, 
a bottle with green liquid, a one gallon can of Toluene, .38 and .22 caliber bullets, bullet 
fragments, shell casings, hair and saliva samples, and gunshot residue from defendant and 
the surviving victim.1 Id. 
In January 1998, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office sent a letter to the State 
Hospital, explaining that it did not intend to pursue the originally-filed criminal charges 
against defendant and that it would support the Hospital's decision to place defendant on 
"less restrictive housing and treatment." R558. In October 2002, the district attorney's 
office received word that defendant was about to be released from civil commitment because 
he was "no longer psychotic." R562-63. 
]Not all evidence was destroyed. The following evidence was preserved and given 
to the defense: autopsy photos and reports of all three victims; toxicology reports on the 
victims; a rape report by St. Mark's Hospital; photos taken of weapons and ammunition; 
firearm analysis reports; transcripts of interviews taken from one of the shooting victims 
and the sexual assault victim; witness statements; a videotape of the interview of the 
sexual assault victim; and a videotape and photos of the crime scene. R60-61. 
3 
The State recharged defendant on November 13, 2002, with three counts of murder, 
first degree felonies.2 Rl-5; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004). The State did not 
refile the other felony counts. Id. Defendant was bound over as charged after a preliminary 
hearing. R99; R630:5 et seq.; R632:2. After holding a hearing, the trial court found 
defendant competent to stand trial. R638:43. 
Defendant moved to suppress the confession he gave police the day after the murders. 
R246-67. He also moved to dismiss the charges based on the State's destruction of physical 
evidence. R388-403. The trial court denied both motions. R585-95;R599-606. This Court 
granted defendant's timely petition for interlocutory appeal from both rulings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
On November 1,1991, defendant shot three people: Susie Sessions; her 14-year-old 
son, Scotty Bunnel; and Chuck Timberman. R630:15-10.25-30. Defendant then raped 
Susie's sister at gunpoint. R630:25-27. Susie and Chuck died that night. R630:19, 25, 30-
31. Scotty survived, but lived the next ten years as a paraplegic. He died in 2001 from 
complications of the paraplegia caused by the gunshot wounds. State's Preliminary Hearing 
Exhibit #11, in manila envelope marked "Exhibits." 
2The victim of defendant's attempted murder had since died. 
3Because defendant has not yet been convicted, he is still entitled to the 
presumption of innocence. Nevertheless, the following facts, taken from the preliminary 
hearing, are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's rulings. See State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Utah 1996). 
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"(PJlay deadj please, please" 
Susie Sessions and her sister Debrah Southerland had known defendant for about 
thirteen years. R 630:39, On Friday, November 1, 1991, Susie-and her son Scotty were 
moving oi it of their apartment; Debrah andhei bo> fi iei id, Chuck, v • ei emo\ ing to Phoenix. 
R630:7-8.. Debrah was pregnant with Chuck's child. R630:8. The foi u: planned to spend 
that night in a motel, but defendant invited them to "come stay at his trailer." R630:9. They 
accepted and drove over in two cars, packed with all their belongings. R630:9-10. 
Susie and Debrah made dinner. R 630: \fter dinner, 1:1 v; .• w atched television 
together. R630:13. At about 10:30 p.m., defendant retired to his bedroom. Id. Becailse of 
a strong "glue smell," Debrah suspected that defendant was sniffing an inhalant. Id. 
Susie, Scotty, Debrah, and Chuck went to bed around 12:30 a.m. R630:14-15. Susie 
and Scotty slept ii i the li\ ing room, w ith Si isie on the coi id I ai id Scotty 1> ing iieai 1:>> on tl le 
floor on some cushions. Id. Debrah and Chuck slept on a mattress in a second bedroom. 
Debrah and Chuck had "just fallen asleep when [they] heard . . . a pop, a real loud 
pop"c. ii-cig IH •;.. -.. front room. : ." * * ! \KK ' K\ \\ pet I, ;\ ' exclaiming, "What the 
f*** was that." R630:l 7. I he door to the bedroom slid opei I and Debrah saw defei idai it 
"standing in the doorway with a gun. You could see the light from the hallway through his 
glasses. And I s een . . . him shoot the gun, the fire come out of the gun with the smoke." Id. 
Chi ick fell back < )i 11 he 1 >ed next t< > Del >ral I. R630:18 Chuck told Debrah to "play 
dead." R630:18. Debrah heard two more shots from the front re :>ITI, She start .ed to get up, 
but Chuck put his arm on her and pleaded, "play dead, please, please." Id. 
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Defendant reappeared in the bedroom doorway. He fired two more shots. Id. 
Chuck's body jerked. Chuck told Debrah that he could not move. Id. Debrah heard two 
more shots from the living room. Id. 
"[PJlease don H shoot me, I'm already paralyzed." 
Debrah "played dead" for the next two hours while defendant "went from one room 
to the other back and forth." R630:18. A "good 10 times," defendant came to Debrah's 
bedroom and "slid[] the door open, turn[ed] on the light and look[ed], turn[ed] the light off 
and shut the door" before "going back" to the front room. R630:19. 
In the meantime, Chuck died. R630:19. He "had like the death rattle." R630:20. 
"He was trying to breathe and couldn't breathe and all of the sudden he was quiet." Id. 
It was quiet for a long time before Debrah heard her nephew Scotty say, "Please don't 
shoot me, please don't shoot me, I'm already paralyzed." R630:19. Debrah heard defendant 
reply, "I'll try not to." Id. 
"There was blood everywhere." 
The sun was coming up when defendant returned to the bedroom and told Debrah "to 
get up." Id. When Debrah just lay there, defendant said, "I know you're not dead, get up." 
Id. Debrah pulled the covers from her head to see defendant pointing a handgun at her. Id. 
After convincing defendant to lower the gun, Debrah, naked, stood up and put on her robe. 
R630:21. Afraid to turn her back to defendant, Debrah walked backwards down the hall to 
the living room. Id. Defendant followed with the gun "by his side." Id. 
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In the living room, defendant ordered Debrah to sii »|nv u She started In Ml on a i, h*ii ••. 
but the cushions were gone, causing her to get back up. Id. Startled, defendant again pointed 
the gun at Debrah. Id, Debrah put one hand on the gun while she begged defendant to lower 
it because he wa s "scaring" hei, hi 1 )eleinkinl reached into his pocket to pull out another 
gun. R630:21-22. . Debrah reached for the second gi in with her other hand , bi it tl len 
defendant promised not to shoot and he put both guns down. Id. 
Defendant handed Debrah a cigarette. R630:22. Susie's body, covered by a blanket, 
was hing on Ihe i I'liili Kh3(i\\S SentU iillc--:- - .. - .- ; in e on the cushions on the 
floor. R630:22, 30. He had three bullet holes, one 111 hi* IVJ! ? - k Ro v(); u\ 11^ e\e 
was messed up, where the bullet went in." Id. He also had a bullet wound in his right 
forearm. R630:30-31. "Ihere was blood everywhere" around Scotty. R630:31. His 
blankets, pillow , an ;:i 1:1 leci ishions • v sre "all covered in blood " R 630:31,22 Scotty's "legs 
were bended a little bit and he was like not completely on his she 1 llder, like halfwa y on his 
shoulder." R630:22. 
Scotty asked Debrah for some water. R630:22. With defendant's permission, Debrah 
got him some, R 630:22-23. Scot"' • asked Debrah to mo v e him because I lis shoulder hurt. 
But Debrah "just fixed the cushion, didn't move him because he was paralyzed" and she was 
"scared he was going to get worse." R630:23. Debrah straightened out Scotty's legs, but 
Scotty "'(in! "In: eouhin 1 (eel llliem)."' /0' . ;' •' '••'•-
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"Why did you shoot my mom?" 
Debrah sat with defendant and Scotty in the living room for a couple of hours. 
R630:24. Defendant was sniffing something that smelled like glue out of a glass jug. Id. 
At one point, defendant pulled the blanket off Susie's face and asked, "Isn't she pretty now?" 
R630:25. Debrah saw that Susie had been shot in the face. "Her eye was gone." Id. 
Scotty asked defendant, "Why did you shoot my mom?" R630:37. Defendant said 
that "she didn't love him, that if she would have just kissed him the night before it would be 
all right." R630:37. Defendant said "he killed Chuck because Chuck was going to beat him 
up for killing Susie." Id. When Scotty asked why he shot him, defendant replied, "cause 
you'd tell on me. And Scotty says no, I wouldn't tell on you. I'm scared of you." R630:37. 
Defendant replied, "you are now." R630:37. 
Debrah asked defendant "why he didn't shoot [her]." He replied, "you didn't, you 
haven't done nothing to me. And I can be a better father to that baby than Chuck can." Id. 
«[N]ot in front of Scotty" 
Eventually, defendant ordered Debrah to "drop [her] robe." R630:25. Debrah said 
she would, "but not in front of Scotty." Id. Defendant said "he was going to f* * * [her] dead 
or alive" and ordered her down the hallway. R630:26. Defendant, guns in hand, told Debrah 
to stop in the middle of the hallway and to drop her robe. Id. He "took down his pants, told 
[Debrah] to lay down and then he got on [her]." Id. Defendant held "the gun to [her] 
temple" while he raped her. R630:26-27. After "climax[ing]," he got off. Debrah "looked 
8 
over towards the, bedroom" and saw "Chuck laying on the mattress." R63027 I le v\ us 
"already turning gray." Defendant said this was "his best love making he ever had." Id. 
"[IJfyou say anything Pm going to do both barrels into you " 
Defendant let Debrah dress inthebedroon 1. R 630:28-29 I hey tl lenreti ii nedto the 
front room where defendant "started . . . nodding out." Defendant wanted Debrah "to go 
with him in his bedroom and get between the wall and the mattress so he could go to sleep." 
Debrah refused because "it was like me putting myself in a coffin. I just couldn't do it." Id. 
Debrah instead offered to get del en dan I cocaine . 'ah told defendant that h^c 
only had to make a phone call. Id. When defendant said he did not have a phone, Debrah 
pointed out "that 7-11 was just down the street." Id. Defendant agreed to go and had Debrah 
drive -. N .,u. i\n;u,^, Defendant took his two guns with him. R630:32. 
Upon reaching -: • -• • approached the pay phone w here Debrah dialed a 
random number and pretended to talk to her drug dealer. As they returned to the car, Debrah 
asked if she could buy a drink. R630:30-32. After looking inside the store, defendant said, 
"Yeah, if you say any thing I'm going to do both barrels into you and [the lady cashier]." 
R630:32-33. Because defendant had alread\ killed (wo people, Debrah decided nni i. u 
inside. Debrah and defendant instead bought sodas at a drive-thru fast food restaurant. Id. 
"And that's when I started crying.. " 
Debrah then dro^ - e to a gas station in I\ lidvale tlia t had a pay phone that she could 
drive up to. R630:33. She hoped that if she could p -^  n ^ J /Vfen ! -
stay in the car while she got out to make another phone call. Id. Debrah's plan worked and 
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she called Susie's friend Pat and arranged to immediately go to her house. Id. 
Debrah then told defendant that he could not go with her because "they won't sell me 
anything." R630:33-34. At first, defendant told Debrah to "forget it." R630:34. Debrah 
replied, "Fine, it's right there if you want it." Id. Defendant asked how long it would take 
her. Id. Debrah said, "Five minutes. You can watch me. It's right there around the corner." 
Id. Defendant relented and got out of the car with his two handguns. Id. 
Debrah drove a few blocks to Pat's house where she told Pat to "dial 911" because 
"Chuck's dead, Susie's dead and Scotty's paralyzed and he's bleeding to death." Id. 
Responding officers asked Debrah to go with them to identify defendant. R630:34-35. 
Debrah resisted because defendant "swore it'd be both barrels in me," but finally agreed. Id. 
Debrah saw defendant from an unmarked police car walking down the street. 
R630:35-36. Debrah "hollered to the cops, there he is" and lay down in the seat. "And that's 
when I started crying." Debrah "heard the cops say he's drawing, he's drawing. And [she] 
heard on the speaker, the cop says, drop it or we'll drop you." Id. When Debrah finally 
looked, defendant was down on the ground and police had taken two guns from him. Id. 
After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant confessed to the shootings that afternoon. 
See Transcript of Interview with Defendant (Addendum C) [hereafter "T" followed by page 
number]. He also admitted to having intercourse with Debrah, but claimed that it was 
consensual and that she had said "it was real enjoyable." T:22. 
Additional relevant facts are contained in the argument section. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: "[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a 
confession is m* * oluntary'" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 I i.S I N> " 1  h 1 I I {)Kb), I he li'uil court here lounil no evidence of any coercive 
police tactics in obtaining defendant's confession, which was made only four minutes after 
Miranda warnings. Defendant has not shown that finding to be clearly erroneous. Absent 
any evidence of police coercion, defendant's alleged mental condition and intoxication did 
noi iviiiki liis confession eonstiiutioiiiill) nisnluntan, Defendant's waiver of his Miranda 
rights was likewise knowing and voluntary, where police used no coervh e tactics lo ohkuii 
the waiver and where defendant appear lucid and responsive. Finally, defendant did not 
unequivocally invoke his right to silence when he said two minutes after waiving Miranda, 
"I tlt'ii'l want to talk alioyl,'" In rontext, it is clear that defendant was referring to Susie's 
injuries and that he was not attempting to terminate tl le ii iterv iew. 
Point II: Defendant argues that the police destruction of physical evidence violated 
his federal and state due process rights. Because defendant claims that the destroyed 
evidence was on!> potentially i lseful, he cai 1 prevail oi: i -1 ^  federal claim only if he shows that 
the police acted in bad faith. Defendant has not made the reqi lisite showing of bad fa ith. 
This Court should decline to consider defendant's proposed state constitutional analysis 
because lie did not present that claim to the trial court. Should this Court nevertheless 
consider defendant''s state constitutional clain 1, it should adopt the well-reasoned federal 
standard. In any case, defendant cannot and has not shown a violation of slate dm process. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT5 S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS HIS CONFESSION, WHERE POLICE USED NO 
COERCIVE TACTICS, DEFENDANT APPEARED SOBER AND 
LUCID, AND DEFENDANT DID NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY INVOKE 
HIS RIGHT TO SILENCE 
Defendant argues that his confession should be suppressed for three reasons: (1) his 
confession was involuntary under the federal constitution (Br. Aplt. 15-27); (2) his waiver 
of Miranda rights was not knowing or voluntary (id); and (3) he unequivocally invoked his 
right to silence before confessing (id. at 27-34).4 As explained below, the trial court properly 
found that defendant's confession was not involuntary under the federal constitution because 
the police employed no coercive tactics. The record refutes defendant's claims that his 
waiver of Miranda rights was not knowing or voluntary or that he unequivocally invoked his 
right to silence. 
A. The confession. 
Detective Edwards and Sergeant Spann of the West Valley Police Department 
interviewed defendant at the police station the afternoon of November 2,1991, the same day 
defendant was arrested. R630:35; Add. C. They videotaped the interview.5 The videotape 
4Defendant treats the first two issues together. This brief, however, will treat them 
separately because while the same constitutional standard applies to the voluntariness of 
both a confession and a waiver, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986), 
the factual inquiry is distinct. It is possible to have a voluntary confession, but an 
involuntary waiver and vice versa. 
5The videotape is with the transcript in an envelope marked R611. For the 
convenience of the Court, citations to the videotape will be to "VT" followed by the 
12 
begins at 1:58 p.m. VT:1:58. It shows defendant seated behind i\ l.ible with his hands 
cuffed in front of him. Id. Detective Edwards is seated on the opposite side of the table with 
his side to the camera, while Sergeant Spann is seated to defendant's left, off camera. Id. 
. . ;L\ jnuuLi ;s looking down at his hands, but he 
looks up when one of the officers asks him to sign a coi isent form to search 1 lis ti ailei 
VT:1:58; T:3. Defendant immediately responds by moving forward, taking a pen, and 
signing the document. VT: 1:58. While defendant is so engaged, the other officer asks if he 
is signing the- A\ : . CMU.-H , > \ ^ h ^
 t ., \> defendant continues to 
sign, the first officer states that defendant has aclr-^ . >h d h - • h^ md said lh.il he is i i-l 
intoxicated with alcohol. Id. Defendant interrupts and states that he is intoxicated with 
Toluene, which he has been using since 1962. Id. One of the officers asks if defendant is 
incapable nf understaiulim? Ji'nl answering questions 1 iefendant replies, "Sometimes. I 
don't know." The officer then asks, "Do y oi 11 mdersta: •• •*•>* difference between right and 
wrong right now?" Defendant answers, "I do now. I didn't then." Id. Throughout this 
initial exchange, defendant is engaged and makes eye contact with the two officers. Id. 
The officers then i noved the table, shifted defendant's chair, and appeared to leave the 
room. Defendant remained seated and again looked down at his hands, LI \ccnvding lo the 
time stamp on the videotape, the camera was turned off at 2:01 p.m. These first three 
minutes are not transcribed. 
I he camera wns tnrnnl hurls MM ,il 1I" I \ \\ in I his is w lucre Ihe transcript u ;;ie 
applicable timestamp on the tape, thus: VT: 1:158. 
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interview begins. See T:l. When the camera came back on, defendant was in the same 
position as before, seated behind the table, with his head lowered, looking down. The 
officers returned and resumed their former positions. VT:2:13. 
One of the officers asked defendant to lookup a little bit. Defendant did not move 
or respond. Id. After announcing the date and time, Detective Edwards stated, "I have to 
read you your rights per [MJiranda. Do you understand that?" T:l. Defendant replied, 
"Ya." Id. Detective Edwards then reviewed each individual right, asked defendant if he 
understood, and paused while defendant responded affirmatively6: 
RE: You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law. You have the right to have a lawyer 
present before any questioning. Do you understand that? 
D: . . . inaudible . . .7 
RE: Do you understand that you can stop this questioning at anytime? 
D: Ya. 
RE: If you cannot afford an attorney, we will provide one for you. Do you 
understand that? 
D: Ya. 
RE: Do you still wish to speak to us at this time? 
D: Ya. 
T: 1. Detective Edwards next asked defendant if he was intoxicated. Defendant responded, 
"On [TJoluene." Id. Defendant explained that Toluene is a paint thinner. Id. Detective 
Edwards then asked: 
RE: Okay, do you know why we're going to talk to you? 
D: Ya. 
6
"RE" is Detective Edwards; "ES" is Sergeant Spann; and "D" is defendant. 
7Although the transcript says "inaudible" here, defendant can be heard to say 
"Ya," at this point on the videotape. VT:2:14. 
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RE: 
D: 
RE: 
D: 
RE: 
D: 
RE: 
D: 
RE: 
What are we going to talk to you about? 
The murders out there. 
What murders? 
The murders out there at West Valley. 
Who are they? 
Suzie, Chuck and Scotty. 
Whose Suzie? 
She's the woman I love. 
That you love? 
T:l-2. Defendant started crying at this point. Detective Edwards asked what happened to 
Suzie and defendant replied: 
D: I don't want to talk about it. 
RE: You don't want to talk about it? 
D: No. 
T:2. Sergeant Spann then asked: 
ES: Edgar? 
D: What. 
ES: Why don't you want to talk about it? 
D: I love that woman so much. 
T:2. At this point, less than two minutes had elapsed since defendant waived his Miranda 
rights. VT:2:15. Throughout this interchange, defendant cried and looked down. 
After a short pause, Sergeant Spann asked, "What is it that you don't want to talk 
about?" VT:2:15. After another short pause, during which defendant continued to softly cry, 
Sergeant Spann said, "You said murders in West Valley, where in West Valley." Id. 
Defendant responded with his address. T:2. Detective Edwards then asked who lived with 
defendant. Id. Defendant replied that Suzie and Scotty had just moved in the night before. 
Id. This exchange immediately followed: 
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RE: Okay, what don't you want to talk about? Edgar? What don't you want 
to talk about, Ed?8 
ES: Edgar, we're not going to force you [to] talk about anything. We're 
asking you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer[] 
[his] questions, not answer that question, answer this question, not 
answer that question. You don't have to answer any of our questions 
at all. You can stop at anytime. 
D: Okay. 
ES: He made that clear to you, right? 
D: Ya. 
ES: Okay. You stated you wanted to talk to us, what part do you and what 
part don't you want to talk to us about? 
T:3. At this point, only three minutes had passed since defendant waived his Miranda rights 
and said he wanted to talk to police. VT:2:16. When defendant did not immediately 
respond, Detective Edwards asked, "Edgar do you remember me reading you[r] rights earlier 
and you signing a waiver for us to search your home?" When defendant acknowledged this, 
Detective Edwards explained that they found the victims there. He then asked, "Who shot 
them?" Defendant replied, "Me." T:3; VT:2:17. Defendant's confession came only four 
minutes after the interview began. Id. 
Defendant then explained that he shot Suzie because he loved her and that he shot 
Chuck "[j]ust to cover up the murder." T:3-4; VT:2:17. Defendant told police that he shot 
Suzie first and that he used a .22 and a .38 in the shootings. T:5-6. He explained where he 
kept his guns. T:6. Defendant's account of the shootings was consistent with Debrah's 
preliminary hearing testimony. For example, he said he shot Susie and Scotty first, and then 
Chuck. T:6, 10-11. He also talked about going back and forth between rooms and turning 
8On the videotape, defendant appears to be crying here. VT:2:16. 
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Debrah's bedroom light on and off. Till He acknowledged having sex with Debrah after 
the shootings, but claimed it was consensual. T:22. He confirmed that Debrah had promised 
to get him cocaine. T:20. 
Although defendant could not remember the day of the week or whether the victims 
had moved in during the day or night, T:4, defendant was able to give several complex and 
detailed answers to the questions put to him. For example, he gave police his license plate 
number and the make of his car, T:4, Susie's former address, T:9, the month and year he had 
suffered a stroke, T:8-9, details about his physical condition, T:8-9, the month and year he 
began receiving SSI, T:8, and a list of grievances he had against Susie. T:7,9-10,16-17. 
All of defendant's answers were responsive to the questions put to him and many of 
them volunteered details. See, e.g., T:8, 14, 16, 17, 23, 27. However, while almost all of 
defendant's answers were rational, two arguably were not: 
RE: Okay. Is there any mental problems? 
D: Ya. All kinds. 
RE: What kind of mental problems? 
D: See, I think I'm Adolf Hitler. Adolf Hitler died in May of 1945 and I 
was born in 19, October 1946. I think I'm Adolf Hitler. 
T:9. Defendant started to cry again during the last sentence. VT:2:24. Later in the 
interview, defendant said he did not know why he shot the victims and that the devil told him 
to do it: 
RE: When you was in the back bedroom, Edgar, with the gun, why did you 
have to go out and shoot them? 
D: I don't have any idea. 
RE: Did you hear any voices? 
D: I think so. I don't know. 
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RE: Who was telling you to go shoot them? 
D: The devil. 
T:13-14. 
Although defendant's head was lowered and he looked down through almost the entire 
interview, he was alert and responsive. Several times during the interview, defendant raised 
his hands to adjust his glasses or scratch his head. E.g., VT:2:19; 2:22-25; 2:28; 2:32; 2:34; 
2:38; 2:39-41. He often shook his head while answering questions. E.g., VT:2:26; 2:28-29; 
2:31-32; 2:35; 2:37. At one point, he showed the officers how he shot the victims by placing 
his hands together and pointing. VT:2:51. At the officers' request he stood to repeat the 
demonstration. VT:2:51-52. He had no difficulty standing and while he limped slightly 
when he sat back down, he explained that this was from an earlier stroke. VT:2:52. 
Defendant's speech was neither slurred nor abnormally slow. See generally VT. 
The interview lasted less than an hour, from 2:13 p.m. to 2:59 p.m. See VT. 
B. A confession is involuntary under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
only if it is the product of coercive police activity. 
Defendant argues that his confession was involuntary under the federal constitution 
because he was incapable of answering questions at the time. He claims that the officers 
knew of his "long-term substance abuse and intoxication," but "made no effort to resolve 
those matters or his inability to understand and answer questions for a clear, unequivocal, 
voluntary waiver and confession." Br. Aplt. 27. "That," according to defendant, "constitutes 
coercion." Id. Defendant's argument contradicts controlling law. 
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall 
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'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.'" Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,163 (1986). Under the Due Process Clause, "'certain interrogation 
techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular 
suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.'" Id. 
(quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)). The Fifth Amendment similarly 
"'protects individuals from being compelled to give evidence against themselves.'" State v. 
Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f 11, 984 P.2d 1009 (citations omitted). 
Thus, "whether admission of a confession into evidence violates the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendment does not turn solely on the 'voluntariness' of the confession." Id. 
Rather, "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is 
not 'voluntary.'" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. AccordRettenberger, 1999 UT 80, f 11; see 
also State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah 1998) ("To violate the Fifth 
Amendment, an accused's admission must, by definition, be coerced"). A confession, then, 
cannot be involuntary under the federal constitution unless there is evidence that coercive 
police conduct caused the confession. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164. 
This is not to say, however, that a suspect's mental condition or state of mind is never 
relevant to the voluntariness inquiry. To the contrary, "as interrogators have turned to more 
subtle forms of psychological persuasion, courts have found the mental condition of the 
defendant a more significant factor in the 'voluntariness' calculus." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 
164. See also Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ^ 15. But "while mental condition is surely 
relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the 
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confessant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry." Connelly, 479 U.S. 
at 165. Again, "for a confession to be involuntary, 'the police must somehow overreach by 
exploiting a weakness or condition known to exist.'" Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 F.3d 403,410 
(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d 1318, 1321 (10th Cir. 1994)) 
(emphasis added). Accord Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65; Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ^ 18; 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998). 
Whether a confession is the product of police coercion is determined by looking at 
the "totality of the circumstances." Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,1j 19; see also Nickel, 97 F.3d 
at 410. Relevant factors include "duration of the interrogation, the persistence of the officers, 
police trickery, absence of family and counsel, and threats and promises made to the 
defendant by the officers." Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,^114. In determining whether police 
exploited a known weakness or condition, courts must also consider such factors "as the 
defendant's mental health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education, age, and 
familiarity with the judicial system." Id. at [^ 15. But again, absent evidence of police 
coercion, a suspect's mental condition or subjective mental state standing alone cannot make 
his statements to police involuntary. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65. 
C. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court properly found no 
evidence of coercive police conduct. 
The trial court applied the foregoing authorities and factors to determine that 
defendant's confession was not coerced and therefore not involuntary under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. SeeR5 87-89,591-93. After viewing the videotape of defendant's 
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confession, the trial court found no evidence that the officers used any mentally coercive 
techniques. R591-92. In making this finding, the trial court first considered the objective 
factors listed and applied in Rettenberger. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, fflf 14, 20-36. 
The trial court found that the officers "did not make use of false statements or half-
truths." R591; compare Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ffif 20-23 (finding some 36 police 
misrepresentations sufficiently egregious to be coercive). The trial court next found that the 
officers "did not use the false friend technique by implying they were acting in the best 
interests of the defendant." R591; compare id. at fjf 24-28 ("extensive" use of "false friend" 
technique, combined with other coercive tactics, exploited suspect's known mental 
weaknesses). The trial court then found that the officers "did not use any threats or promises 
to entice the defendant into a confession." R591; compare id. at fflf 29-32 (finding threats 
of the death penalty and promises of leniency if defendant confessed coercive). Finally, the 
trial court noted that the entire interview was completed within one hour and that "defendant 
was not denied any special requests." R591; compare id. at ^[ 35-36 (18-year-old 
defendant was interrogated several hours over two-day period, denied request to call his 
mother or use bathroom, and given 22 hours in solitary confinement). The trial court thus 
concluded that "the detective[s'] interrogation was absent of suggestive and coercive 
techniques" and that there was "no evidence of any ethical misconduct by the police." R591-
92. 
The trial court then turned to the subjective factors listed in Rettenberger that might 
have made the defendant more susceptible to manipulation. R592-93. The trial court noted 
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that defendant had "severe impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q," which likely 
stemmed from defendant's prolonged use of Toluene, a prior stroke, or a childhood head 
injury. R592. The trial court also considered defendant's "belief that he was Adolph Hitler, 
but determined that the statement in context indicated that defendant knew that Hitler was 
dead and that he was not actually Adolph Hitler.9 Id. The trial court also concluded that 
defendant's reference to the devil telling him to shoot the victims possibly stemmed from his 
religious beliefs. Id. Finally, the trial court noted that while defendant did not answer all 
questions intelligently, he did provide "clear and detailed answers to many of the questions." 
R592-93. The court thus concluded that "[considering the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding defendant's interrogation, including his treatment by the detectives and his 
mental state," defendant's confession violated neither the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 
R594. In short, the trial court found no evidence that the police used any coercive tactics that 
could have been construed to have exploited any known mental condition. 
The videotape of defendant's interview supports the trial court's findings and 
conclusions. As the trial court found, the officers made no false statements, threats, or 
promises to entice the defendant to confess. R591-92. Indeed, they had no time in which to 
employ any coercive tactics because defendant confessed to the shootings within four 
9In context, defendant's comment about Hitler suggests that, at most, he believed 
he was a reincarnation of Hitler. See also R549-50. Given that 27% of Americans 
believe in reincarnation, defendant's belief is not necessarily irrational or a sign of 
incompetence. See The Religious and Other Beliefs of Americans 2003, The Harris Poll 
#11, Feb. 26, 2003 at http://www.harrisinteractivexom/harris_poll/index.asp?PID:=359. 
Last visited on March 23, 2006. 
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minutes of being given his Miranda warnings. VT.2:13-17. But even after defendant 
confessed, the officers used no coercive tactics. They never shouted or raised their voices 
at defendant; nor did they make any threatening gestures. See generally VT. Rather, their 
tone was conversational and non-threatening. Id. They asked non-suggestive questions and 
treated defendant with respect. And the interview was over in less than an hour. 
D. The police did not exploit defendant's alleged mental condition or intoxication. 
Defendant does not quarrel with the foregoing findings of the trial court. He does not 
claim that the officers made threats or promises, used the false friend technique, or denied 
defendant any special requests. Br. Aplt. 20-21. Nor does he argue that it was improper for 
the trial court to consider the foregoing objective and subjective factors. Id. at 20-22. 
Rather, he argues only that the trial court erroneously "failed to consider several [other] 
relevant circumstances." Id. at 21. Specifically, he argues that the officers engaged in 
coercive tactics by "disrespecting his requests to not talk about the shootings; moving 
forward with the interrogation while [defendant] cried; persisting with repeated questions at 
times; accelerating the pace or trading off with questions." Id. at 20. Defendant also 
contends that the "officers were advised of and observed [defendant's] intoxicated and 
mental condition at the beginning of and during the interrogation," and that they used this 
knowledge to exploit defendant's impaired condition with the foregoing tactics. 
1. The tactics defendant alleges were not coercive. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, the trial court overlooked no coercive tactics. First, 
the officers did not "disrespect" his "requests to not talk about the shootings." This argument 
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apparently alludes to his saying that he did not "want to talk about i f when the officers asked 
who Susie was. Br. Aplt. 22; T:l-2. This claim, however, presupposes that defendant's 
statement meant that he did not want to talk about the shootings at all and that the officers 
intentionally disregarded defendant's wishes. The record does not support that assumption. 
As the trial court understood this statement in context, defendant was not asking to 
terminate the interview. R590. Rather, he was simply stating that he did not want to talk 
about Susie, the woman he claimed to love. The videotape and transcript support this 
reading. The statement came after the officers asked defendant who Susie was. T:2. 
Defendant began crying as he answered, "She's the woman I love." VT:2:15, When the 
officer repeated, "That you love," defendant said, "I don't want to talk about it." T:2. When 
the officers asked why defendant did not "want to talk about it," defendant responded, "I love 
that woman so much." Id. The officers shifted their questioning from specifics about Susie 
to general questions about where the murders occurred. Id. Defendant readily answered 
those questions. Id. The officers then asked defendant exactly what defendant did not want 
to talk about. Id. They reminded defendant that he did not have to answer any of their 
questions and that he could stop at any time.10 T:3. That repeated warning dispels any claim 
10Before that reminder, the officers told defendant that he could choose which 
questions he wanted to answer. T:3. Defendant faults the officers for giving him false 
advice on this point. In fact, their statement was not false. See United States v. May, 52 
F.3d 885, 890 (10th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that "partial silence" resulting from 
invocation of Miranda regarding some questions still shielded defendant from prosecutor 
comment on his silence). In any event, the officers immediately followed up 1hat 
statement with a reaffirmation that defendant could refuse to answer all their questions 
and couid stop the interview at any time. T:3.. 
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that the officers disregarded any desire by defendant not to talk. 
Defendant other claims of coercion—questioning a crying defendant, repeating 
questions, accelerating the pace, and trading off—are frivolous. Defendant cites no 
authority, and the State is aware of none, that any of these alleged tactics are coercive either 
individually or collectively.11 
Defendant finally suggests that the interview was coerced because it was held at the 
police station and defendant did not have the support of family, friends, or a lawyer. Br. 
Aplt. 21. While holding an interview at the police station may be a factor contributing to a 
finding of coercion, it is hardly dispositive. Most interrogations are conducted in the 
controlled environment of a police station. See State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 
1995) (holding interview at police station instead of crime scene supported finding of no 
coercion). Moreover, the mere absence of friends, or a lawyer is not coercive, particularly 
where, as here, the defendant expressly waived his right to have counsel with him and did 
not ask for the support of family and friends. Indeed, most voluntary confessions are made 
without family, friends, or lawyers present. E.g., Galli, 967 P.2d at 933-97; State v. Bybee, 
2000 UT 43, fflj 17-30, 1 P.3d 1087; State v. Dutchie, 96 P.2d 422,424-29 (Utah 1998). 
In sum, defendant has not shown that the trial court clearly erred when it found that 
the police engaged in coercive tactics. 
nThe State does not concede that the officers in fact used any of these alleged 
tactics. Indeed, a review of the videotape shows no appreciable "acceleration of the 
pace," no strategic "trading off," no undue repetition, and no real pressing of an 
emotionally distraught defendant. 
25 
2. The police did not exploit any known mental condition. 
Defendant faults the trial court for not sufficiently taking into account his mental 
condition. Defendant contends that "the circumstances support 'the strongest probability that 
[he was] incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed.'" Br. Aplt. 24 (quoting Blackburn 
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (I960)). Defendant argues that this made him incapable of 
voluntarily confessing. Id. at 24-26. As a preliminary matter, the trial court considered this 
argument and rejected it based on the videotape. R593-94 The law and the facts support that 
ruling. 
As it did below, defendant's claim relies heavily on Blackburn, which suppressed a 
confession made by an insane defendant. Br. Aplt. 24-26. But as the trial court recognized, 
Blackburn is readily distinguishable. R593-94. Blackburn challenged the admission of his 
confession to an armed robbery on the ground that he was insane when he confessed, thereby 
rendering it involuntary. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 201-04. Blackburn had a long history of 
mental illness and treatment. Before the robbery, "he was classified by the Veterans 
Administration as 100 percent 'incompetent.'" Id. at 200-01. Experts testified at the 
suppression hearing that Blackburn was likely insane and incompetent when he confessed. 
Id. at 202-03. The sheriff reported that Blackbum exhibited "symptoms of insanity" after his 
arrest. Id. at 201. Blackburn informed police that he had been a patient in a mental 
institution, but stated that he had been released. Id. at 204. The police interrogated 
Blackburn for eight or nine hours "in closely confined quarters—a room about four by six 
or six by eight feet—in which as many as many as three officers had at times been present 
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with Blackburn." Id at 204. 
The trial court here noted that none of the foregoing factors was present in this case. 
R593. The interview lasted less than an hour and defendant had not been found to be 
"incompetent" or "insane" before the crime or confession. R593-94. Nor is there any 
evidence that defendant had ever received any mental health treatment before the murders. 
No expert testified here that defendant was incompetent when he confessed. Defendant does 
not dispute any of this, but points to the finding that he was incompetent to stand trial a few 
months later. Br. Aplt. 24-25. Defendant surmises that this subsequent finding means that 
he must have been incompetent to confess. Id. 
That defendant was later declared incompetent to stand trial does not mean he was 
incompetent to confess when he did so. But whether or not defendant was technically 
competent to confess is irrelevant absent any evidence of police coercion. See Connelly, 479 
U.S. at 164-65. Even Blackburn implicitly recognized this. There the confession was 
suppressed not just because Blackburn appeared to be incompetent, but also because the 
police knew of his mental condition and had used coercive tactics. See Blackburn, 361 U.S. 
at 207-08. As the Supreme Court in Connelly explained, Blackburn involved "the integral 
element of police overreaching," which "exploited" the defendant's known mental 
"weakness with coercive tactics: 'the eight- to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny 
room which was upon occasion literally filled with police officers; the absence of 
Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel; [and] the composition of the confession by 
the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn.'" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65 (quoting 
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Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207-08). Thus, unlike the trial court here, the Blackburn court found 
the necessary predicate to involuntariness: "coercive police activity." Id. at 167. 
Moreover, while the officers in Blackburn were aware of the defendant's history of 
mental illness and treatment, the officers here had no indication of a possible mental illness 
until after defendant had confessed. Contrary to defendant's claim, the officers were neither 
advised of nor observed any impairment in defendant's mental condition at the beginning of 
the interview. During the first few minutes, defendant was alert, made eye contact, signed 
a waiver, and corrected the officers when they stated he was not intoxicated with alcohol. 
VT: 1:58-2:00. Although he volunteered that he was intoxicated with Toluene, he said 
nothing about any mental illness at that point. Id. Indeed, it is not until page nine of the 
transcript, or 10 minutes into the interview, that defendant, in response to a question, claimed 
to have "[a]ll kinds" of mental problems. T:9; VT:2:23-24. But by then, defendant had 
already confessed to the shootings in detail. See T:3-8. Nothing before that point would 
have alerted the officers that defendant might have had a mental illness or that he could not 
understand his rights or the questions put to him. Nor would the officers have thought 
defendant was incapable of answering questions after he said he had "all kinds" of mental 
problems. Unlike Blackburn, defendant had no history of treatment for mental illness and, 
as stated, his answers throughout the interview were responsive and, for the most part, 
rational. The officers, therefore, did not exploit defendant's claimed incompetence to obtain 
the confession. 
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3. The police did not exploit defendant's alleged intoxication. 
Defendant also claims that the trial court did not sufficiently consider his intoxication 
on Toluene. Br. Aplt. 21-23. He points out that he told officers at the beginning that he was 
intoxicated on Toluene and that when they asked him if he was incapable of answering 
questions, he said, "Sometimes. I don't know." Br. Aplt 21-22. Defendant also argues that 
the officers "would have observed that [defendant's] demeanor was subnormal. He was 
slumped down with his head lowered; at times during the interrogation he cried, and/or he 
appeared confused and exhausted and was unable to answer questions." Br. Aplt. 2. 
Defendant alleges that the officers "brushed aside [defendant]'s obvious impairments and 
inebriated condition to proceed with questioning for a confession." Br. Aplt. 23. 
Clearly, intoxication can be a relevant factor for assessing the voluntariness of a 
confession. See, e.g., Scalissiv. State, 759 N.E.2d 618,621 (Ind. 2001) (intoxication factor 
in considering voluntariness); State v. Bell, 121 P.3d 972, 976-77 (Kan. 2005) (same); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d983, 988 (Mass. 1997) (same). But like all factors in 
a totality of the circumstances analysis, intoxication—like mental condition—by itself does 
not render a confession constitutionally involuntary. See United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 
1057,1066 (10th Cir. 2003) (notperse involuntary);Luckhartv. State, 736 N.E.2d 227,231 
(Ind. 2000) (same); Nichols v. Commonwealth., 142 S.W.3d 683, 692 (Ky. 2004) (same); 
Siler v. State, 115 P.3d 14, 28 (Wyo. 2005) (same). Rather, as Connelly holds, "coercive 
police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary.'" 
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. Thus, even if a suspect is intoxicated, his confession is not 
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rendered constitutionally involuntary unless police exploited that weakness with coercive 
tactics. See United States v. Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1994) (even if 
defendant incapacitated drug addict, his statement not involuntary absent official coercion); 
UnitedStatesv. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018,1022(10thCir. 1993) ("The test is whether the person's 
will was overcome, or whether the statement was freely made."); Graves v. United States, 
878 F. Supp. 409,414 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("limited capacity due to voluntary consumption of 
alcohol" does not render statement involuntary absent official coercion); Scalissi, 759 N.E.2d 
at 621-622 (while intoxication may be factor in determining voluntariness, there must be 
evidence of coercive police activity); State v. Chapman, 605 A.2d 1055,1062 (N.H. 1992) 
(no involuntariness where police "did not take advantage of an intoxicated defendant"); 
Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d 438,446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (suspect's intoxication did not 
raise constitutional voluntariness issues because no police coercion or over-reaching). 
As stated, the trial court here found no evidence of police coercion. Thus, even 
assuming defendant was intoxicated at the time of his confession, that confession was 
constitutionally voluntary. Moreover, courts uniformly agree that intoxication can render 
a confession involuntary only where the suspect is so intoxicated that he does not 
comprehend what he is saying or is unable to carry on a conversation. See, e.g., Cox, 711 
So.2d at 1325 (question is whether defendant is aware, able to comprehend what he is doing, 
and communicate in rational way); Luckhart, 736 N.E.2d at 229-31 (involuntary if 
intoxication renders defendant unconscious of his acts or produces state of mania); Nichols, 
142 S. W.3 d at 691-92 (involuntary if defendant hallucinating or confabulating to compensate 
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for lost memory); Kirksey v. State, 923 P.2d 1102,1109-10 (Nev. 1996) (question is whether 
defendant understands meaning of his comments); Jones v. State, 944 S. W.2d 642, 651 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1996) (question is whether intoxication rendered defendant incapable of making 
independent, informed decision to confess); Siler, 115 P.3d at 26 (Wyo. 2005) (intoxication 
must render defendant incapable of understanding his statements). 
It is clear on this record that defendant was not so intoxicated. Although defendant 
told the officers at the beginning of the interview that he was "intoxicated" on Toluene, 
VT: 1:58, his demeanor did not support that statement. During the first three minutes of the 
videotape, defendant was alert and responsive to the officer's questions and statements. Id. 
He read and signed the waiver and he corrected Detective Edwards when the latter stated that 
defendant was not intoxicated by alcohol. Id. Defendant seizes on his early statement that 
he was "sometimes" incapable of answering questions. Defendant's subsequent responses, 
however, belie that claim. Moreover, even though defendant kept his head lowered 
throughout the interview, he did not, as he now claims, appear "confused and exhausted and 
. . . unable to answer questions." Br. Aplt 22. Rather, as the trial court recognized, 
defendant was able to give detailed, complex answers that were responsive to the questions 
put to him. R592-93. See, e.g., T:5,11 (describing caliber ofpistols used); T: 5-6 (describing 
where he shot Chuck); T:7 (describing his car and license plate number); T:8-9 (giving 
detailed medical history, including when he began receiving SSI); T:15-16 (describing 
Scotty's reaction to his mother's shooting); T: 16-17 (listing several grievances he had against 
Susie); T:29-30 (physically demonstrating how he shot the victims). Finally, his speech was 
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neither slurred nor abnormally slow. 
In sum, the officers did not "brush aside" any "obvious impairments" in questioning 
defendant. Nor can it be said that defendant was so intoxicated that he did not understand 
his statements to police. Defendant's confession, therefore, was constitutionally voluntary. 
E. Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary. 
Defendant argues that his waiver of Miranda was neither knowing or voluntary. 
Whether a suspect has validly waived his Miranda rights depends on the totality of the 
circumstances. State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738,744 (Utah 1997); State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 
224 (Utah 1989). 
"Miranda warnings are intended to guard against the 'inherently coercive nature of 
a custodial police interrogation by fully informing the suspect of the state's intention to use 
any self-incriminating statements to secure his [or her] conviction.'" State v. Archuleta, 850 
P.2d 1232, 1238-39 (Utah 1993) (quoting Strain, 779 P.2d at 224). Thus, the waiver "must 
have been the product of a 'free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or 
deception' and executed with' full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned 
and [of] the consequences of the decision to abandon it.'" Strain, 779 P.2d at 224 (quoting 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). Accord Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1238-39. 
Like the voluntariness inquiry for confessions, the "voluntariness of a waiver of [the 
Fifth Amendment right to silence] has always depended on the absence of police 
overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 
170. This is because the "sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was 
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based, is governmental coercion." Id. Moreover, "the State need prove waiver only by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Id. 
In arguing that his Miranda waiver was unknowing and involuntary, defendant relies 
on many of the same facts cited in his claim of coercion. But just as there is no evidence that 
police coerced defendant's confession, there is no evidence that they coerced his Miranda 
waiver. His rights were read to him on camera and he unequivocally waived each one 
individually. T: 1. The record also shows that defendant, a 45-year-old man, understood his 
rights and the consequences of abandoning those rights. While defendant initially said he 
might be incapable of answering questions because of his Toluene use, his interactions and 
subsequent responses to police show that he fully understood their questions and that he was 
capable of answering them. When asked if he knew why police wanted to talk to him, he 
immediately responded, "The murders out there... at West Valley." T:l-2. When defendant 
said he did not "want to talk about it," the officers again told defendant that he did not "have 
to answer any ofour questions at all. You can stop at any time." T:3. Defendant agreed that 
the officers had made that "clear" to him. T:3. Yet he never said that he would not talk to 
officers at all or that he wished to terminate the interview. More important, defendant's 
responses throughout the interview amply demonstrate that he was sufficiently sober and 
lucid to understand his rights and to waive them.12 The trial court, therefore, properly found 
12Defendant makes much of his subsequent incompetence to stand trial as proof 
that he did not fully understand his Miranda rights. As explained above, however, the 
fact that defendant was later found to be incompetent for purposes of standing trial does 
not necessarily mean that he did not or could not understand his Miranda rights at the 
time he waived them. Indeed, two of his evaluators expressly gave him forensic 
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that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. 
F. Defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent. 
Defendant contends that even if his waiver was voluntary, he subsequently 
unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent when, after the officers asked him what 
happened to Susie, he said, "I don't want to talk about it." Br. Aplt.27-34. See T:2. 
Defendant argues that police were required to terminate the interview at this point. 
Once a custodial suspect "effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the 
Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him." Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994). "But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the 
interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or 
the suspect himself reinitiates conversation." Id. If, however, the suspect is "not reasonably 
clear in his reference to an attorney, officers are not required to stop questioning or focus on 
clarifying the suspect's statement." Leyva, 951 P.2d at 742 (citing Davis). Rather, "'the 
suspect must unambiguously request counsel,'" and if his 'statement fails to meet the 
requisite level of clarity,' then the officers are not required to stop questioning the suspect." 
Id. (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). In other words, "after a knowing and voluntary waiver 
of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless 
the suspect clearly requests an attorney." Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 (emphasis added). This 
warnings, which are very similar to Miranda rights, and noted that he understood those 
rights. R533, 548. One of the evaluators also noted that defendant "was able to described 
what happened in fairly good detail, generally consistent with the police records 
pertaining to the case." R549. 
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Court has extended the Davis rule to reinvocations of the right to remain silent. State v. 
Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 935 n.4 (Utah 1998). 
The question, then, is whether defendant unequivocally invoked his right to remain 
silent when defendant said, "I don't want to talk about it." T:2. When that statement is read 
in context, it is clear that he did not. 
Defendant's statement came after he told officers that Susie, a shooting victim, was 
the woman he loved. Tl-2. Defendant paused as he started to cry. VT:2:15. Detective 
Edwards then asked what happened to Susie, to which defendant replied, "I don't want to 
talk about it." T:2; VT:2:14-15. Detective Edwards repeated, "You don't want to talk about 
it?" And defendant responded "No." T:2. After another short pause while defendant cried, 
Sergeant Spann asked defendant, "Why don't you want to talk about it?" Defendant tearfully 
replied, "I love that woman so much." Id. As stated, this statement came within two minutes 
of defendant's waiving his Miranda rights and telling police that he wanted to talk to them. 
In context, defendant's statement was not an unequivocal invocation of the right to 
remain silent and to not answer any more questions. Rather, the context makes clear that 
defendant only had an emotional aversion to talking about what happened to the "woman 
[he] love[d]." When asked why he did not want to talk about it, defendant did not say he 
wanted to stop answering all questions. Instead, he made it clear that he did not want to talk 
about what happened to Susie because it was emotionally painful for him. Nothing in the 
foregoing suggests that defendant was refusing to answer any questions or that he did not 
want to talk further. The ensuing interchange confirms that reading. 
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The officers asked defendant, "What is it that you don't want to talk about? You said 
murders in West Valley, where in West Valley?" Id. Defendant responded with his address. 
Id. After asking who lived with defendant, the officers repeated, "Okay, what don't you want 
to talk about? Edgar? What don't you want to talk about, Ed?" As defendant continued to 
cry, Sergeant Spann reminded defendant of his right to remain silent: 
Edgar, we're not going to force you [to] talk about anything. We're asking 
you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer[] this question[], 
not answer that question, answer this question, not answer that question. You 
don't have to answer any of our questions at all You can stop any anytime. 
T:3 (emphasis added); VT:2:15-16. Defendant replied, "Okay," and Sergeant Spann added, 
"He made that clear to you, right?" Defendant said, "Ya." The officers then reminded 
defendant that he had just told them that he wanted to talk them. They then asked again, 
"what part do you and what part don't you want to talk to.us about?" Defendant then readily 
answered all other questions put to him.13 T:3; VT:2:16-17. 
If, as defendant now claims, he intended to invoke his right to silence, the officers 
gave him ample opportunity to unequivocally assert that. As soon as he stated that he did not 
"want to talk about it," the officers tried to ascertain what defendant did not want to talk 
about; part of the crime or all of the crime. They also expressly readvised him that he did not 
13Defendant suggests that it is impermissible under Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 
97-98 (1984) to consider any subsequent statements in determining whether an invocation 
is ambiguous. Br. Aplt. 34. It is true that subsequent responses to continued police 
questioning cannot be used to render ambiguous an otherwise unambiguous invocation of 
the right to silence. Smith, 469 U.S. at 97-98. Here, however, defendant's alleged 
invocation was at best ambiguous. His immediate subsequent responses only confirm that 
ambiguity. 
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have to answer any questions and that he could stop the interview at any time. Defendant, 
however, expressed no wish to stop or to not answer any more questions. The contrary, he 
showed a willingness to talk about the crime, just not about the specifics of Susie's injuries. 
Even giving defendant's statement the most liberal reading, it was no more than an 
equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. See, e.g., Owen v. State, 862 So.2d 687, 
696-97 (Fla. 2003) (noting that response "I don't want to talk about it," has been deemed "on 
numerous occasions" to be equivocal). Cf. Galli, 967 P.2d at 935 (interpreting statement "I 
can't even talk right now" as not even equivocal invocation of right to silence). The officers, 
therefore, had no obligation to stop questioning or even to clarify defendant's intent. The 
officers nevertheless clarified defendant's intent by reminding him that he could stop the 
interview at anytime. By not unequivocally invoking his right to remain silent at that point, 
defendant demonstrated that he wished to continue speaking to the officers. 
The trial court therefore did not clearly err in finding that defendant did not 
unequivocally invoke his right to silence. 
POINT II 
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE DID NOT VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WHERE 
POLICE DID NOT ACT IN BAD FAITH; THIS COURT SHOULD NOT 
REACH DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CLAIM, BUT IF IT DOES, THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE 
FEDERAL STANDARD 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have dismissed this case because the 
destruction of physical evidence has impaired his right to a fair trial, thereby violating his due 
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process rights under both the federal and state constitutions. Br. Aplt. 35-50. Defendant's 
federal due process claim fails because he has not shown that the police acted in bad faith in 
destroying the evidence. This Court should not reach his state due process claim because he 
did not preserve it below. Should this Court nevertheless reach that issue, it should decline 
to adopt a different standard under the state constitution. 
A. To prevail on a federal due process claim, defendant must show that the evidence 
was constitutionally material or that it was lost due to bad faith by State actors. 
The State's duty to preserve evidence falls into "what might loosely be called the area 
of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence." California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 
485 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The duty to preserve evidence 
is closely related to the duty to disclose evidence that is exculpatory. The latter is violated 
whenever "the State suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence" 
irrespective of "the good or bad faith of the prosecution" Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 
547 (2004) (per curiam) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) & United States v. 
Agurs, All U.S. 97 (1976)). The "mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information 
might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not 
establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." Agurs, All U.S. at 109-10. Rather, 
omitted evidence is constitutionally material only if it "creates a reasonable doubt that did 
not otherwise exist." Id. at 112. 
The State's duty to preserve evidence is likewise limited to that which is 
constitutionally material: "Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve 
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evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant 
role in the suspect's defense." Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89. "To meet this standard of 
constitutional materiality, . . . evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was 
apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would 
be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." Id. at 489. 
The Due Process Clause, however, imposes a different test when dealing '"with the 
failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that 
it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the 
defendant.'" Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 
(1988)). "[T]he failure to preserve this 'potentially useful evidence' does not violate due 
process 'unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police.'" Id. at 
547-48 (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). Bad faith requires that a defendant show more 
than mere negligence. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. The defendant must show that "the 
police . . . by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the 
defendant." Id. In other words, the bad faith conduct must be such that it supports an 
inference that police destroyed the evidence because they knew of its exculpatory value. See 
State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324 (Utah App. 1998). 
A defendant, then, can establish a due process violation for destruction of evidence 
in two ways: (1) he can show that the destroyed evidence "possess[ed] an exculpatory value 
that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed" and no other comparable evidence is 
available, Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489; or (2) if the evidence is only potentially useful, he can 
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show that the police acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence, such that "their conduct 
indicate[d] that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant," Youngblood, 
488 U.S. at 58. The burden is on the defendant to establish the due process violation. See 
id at 57-58. See also Holden, 964 P.2d at 324. 
B. Defendant has not shown that the destroyed evidence was either constitutionally 
material or destroyed in bad faith. 
The evidence destroyed here included the two revolvers used in the murders, a Code 
R kit, a victim's wallet, heroin, an audio tape, a blood specimen, a make-up kit, drug 
paraphernalia, various articles of the victims' clothing, bedding, a bone fragment found on 
one victim's bed, a bottle with green liquid, a gallon can of Toluene, .38 and .22 caliber 
bullets, bullet fragments, shell casings, hair and saliva samples, and gunshot residue from 
defendant and Debrah. See Add, B. 
Defendant does not claim, nor did he below, that this evidence possessed an 
exculpatory value apparent before it was destroyed. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. See R391-
92. He instead argues that the evidence was "potentially useful" to him and that the police 
acted with bad faith in destroying it. Br. Aplt. 35-42. However, he has shown neither. 
1. The destroyed evidence was not "potentially useful." 
Defendant speculates that the destroyed evidence was "potentially useful" to him in 
three ways: (1) "if the ballistics evidence, blood and tissue samples, gunshot residue and 
fingerprint evidence were such that it would support that [Debrah] was involved in the 
shootings, that evidence would serve to impeach [Debrah's] credibility and her claims 
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regarding [defendant's] actions; (2) the Code R kit might have shown that Debrah did not 
suffer "trauma, tenderness, redness, or bruising to the genitalia for forced penetration," 
thereby impeaching her credibility; (3) evidence "tying drugs and paraphernalia" to Debrah 
and others in the trailer could have created doubt about Debrah's ability to accurately observe 
events or might have shown that victims "made threats to [defendant] in their drug-induced 
state," thereby provoking the attack Br. Aplt. 40-41. 
Defendant's speculation notwithstanding, he has not demonstrated that the destroyed 
evidence was "potentially useful." First, defendant's argument ignores all the evidence that 
has been turned over to him: autopsy photos and reports; toxicology reports; a rape report 
by St. Mark's Hospital; photos of weapons and ammunition; firearm analysis reports; 
transcripts of interviews with Debrah and Scotty; other witness statements; a videotaped 
interview of Debrah; and a videotape and photos of the crime scene. See R60-61. Second, 
it ignores Debrah's eyewitness testimony and defendant's own confession. Taken together, 
this dispels any claim that the destroyed evidence was potentially useful or that there is no 
comparable available evidence. 
For example, defendant may use Debrah's interviews, the videotape and photos of the 
crime scene, and the firearm analysis reports, to impeach any inconsistencies or inaccuracies 
that might arise in her testimony. Next, while the Code R kit may be gone, a written rape 
report by the hospital remains. Defendant has not alleged, much less shown, that this report 
is inadequate to show a lack genital injuries. More important, evidence of the sexual assault 
is irrelevant given that defendant is no longer charged with sexual assault. With respect to 
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tying the drugs and paraphernalia to the victims, defendant disregards the toxicology reports 
of Susie and Chuck, which showed no illegal drugs in their blood at the time of death.14 This 
supports Debrah's claim that they did not use drugs that night. R630:40-41. 
But even setting aside the remaining evidence, defendant cannot show that any of the 
destroyed evidence was even potentially useful if this Court concludes that his confession 
was voluntary. Rather, defendant's valid confession, particularly in view of Debrah's 
consistent preliminary hearing testimony, stands as a concession that the destroyed evidence 
was all inculpatory and, therefore, potentially useful only to the State. 
2. The police did not destroy the evidence in bad faith. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the evidence was potentially useful, defendant has not 
carried his burden of proving that police destroyed it in bad faith. As the trial court observed, 
defendant did not even attempt to carry this burden below. R602. Instead, he tried to cast 
his burden on the State by asserting that the State's conduct was "[a]t the very least,... gross 
negligence" (R3 92-93), and that "bad faith should be presumed in this case unless and until 
the government is able to offer an explanation for the destruction of this evidence." R393-
94, 602. The trial court properly rejected this misstatement of the law and found that 
defendant had "failed to meet [his] burden." R602-03. 
For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that the destruction of evidence was in 
bad faith because it was done "wilfully." Br. Aplt. 39. Because defendant did not present 
14
 See Toxicology Reports attached to Autopsy Reports in Envelope marked 
Exhibits. 
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this argument below, this Court should disregard it. See State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, fflf 
47-48, 106 P.3d 734 (declining to consider defendant's claim of bad faith raised for the first 
time on appeal). 
The argument is meritless in any event. That evidence is intentionally destroyed 
pursuant to routine procedures, does not establish bad faith within the meaning of 
Youngblood. See Fisher, 540 U.S. at 546-47 (no bad faith where police, "acting in accord 
with established procedures," destroyed evidence during defendant's ten-year flight from 
justice). As explained above, in demonstrating bad faith, defendant has the burden of 
proving that "the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form 
a basis for exonerating the defendant." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. 
Defendant cannot meet his burden. The evidence was destroyed approximately two 
years after the charges had been dismissed due to defendant's incompetence to stand trial, 
and approximately a year after the court was informed that defendant likely would never be 
competent to stand trial. Add. B;R636:15-17. Indeed, the record suggests that 
everyone—the prosecution, the defense, and the trial court—reasonably believed that 
defendant would never stand trial, but that the community would be adequately protected 
based on his civil commitment. Thus, it was both natural and reasonable for the police to 
assume that the evidence would never be needed. This reasonable assumption was only 
confirmed when five years later, in 1998, the district attorney's office wrote a letter to the 
State Hospital declaring that it still did not intend to pursue the original charges. R558. 
In short, the record makes clear that the police destroyed the evidence according to 
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established procedures and only after the case had been dismissed and it appeared that 
charges would never be refiled. Moreover, police had no reason to think that any of the 
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory in light of defendant's confession and Debrah's 
statement. Accordingly, defendant has not shown police conduct indicating that "the 
evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 88. 
C. Defendant's state constitutional claim is unpreserved. 
Defendant argues that even if he has not shown bad faith, this Court should reverse 
the trial court's ruling based on a state constitutional analysis under article I, § 7, of the Utah 
Constitution. Br. Aplt. 42-50. Defendant urges this Court to reject Youngblood's due 
process analysis and to adopt "a balancing approach" used by a minority of states in 
interpreting their state constitutions. Br. Aplt. 46-50. 
This Court should decline defendant's invitation because he did not make this 
argument below. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990) (declining to 
conduct separate state constitutional analysis where trial court not afforded meaningful 
opportunity to address issue). While defendant asked the trial court to engage in a state 
constitutional analysis, the trial court declined because defendant had "offered no analysis 
concerning the unique context in which Utah's Constitution developed, nor shown why this 
State's Constitution should be interpreted differently than the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution." R604. The trial court also noted that 
although defendant had cited "to numerous cases in other state jurisdictions that have 
'rejected Younblood" he had "not articulated the rulings of other states correctly," nor had 
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he "suggested a viable alternative standard." R605. Indeed, at oral argument on the motion 
to dismiss, defendant cast the burden on the trial court to determine what standard should 
apply under the state constitution: 
And I didn't really address this, you know because it's—it's not really a 
secondary issue, but, I mean, the obvious question is, Well, what standard do 
we follow? And [the] answer is, "Well, these different states have articulated 
a bunch of different standards. If the Court sees fit, you know, that is 
something we can address secondarily as to which standard. But it would be 
something along the lines of what is listed in the motion. 
R63 8:27-28. Defendant's written motion, however, proposed no specific test. See R394-02. 
Because defendant did not preserve the state constitutional analysis that he now urges 
on appeal, this Court should not address it. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, f^ 14, 
122 P.3d 506 ("we are resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not 
been properly preserved, framed and briefed"), cert, granted 126 S.Ct. 979 (Jan. 6,2006).15 
D. Even if defendant had preserved his state constitutional claim, defendant has not 
shown that this Court should adopt a separate state analysis. 
Even if defendant had adequately preserved his state constitutional claim, he has not 
shown that this Court should adopt a separate state constitutional analysis in this case or that 
15This Court should also decline to address defendant's state constitutional claim 
because he has not adequately developed it using "historical and textual evidence, sister 
state law, and policy arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to 
assist [the Court] in arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision in question." 
Society of Separations ts, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993). While 
defendant does cite to sister state law, he fails to analyze his claim within "the unique 
context in which Utah's constitution developed." Bobo, 803 P.3d at 1272 n.5 Indeed, he 
does not even mention that the language of the federal and state due process clauses are 
identical or explain why, given that circumstance, the clauses should be interpreted 
differently. 
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it should reject Youngblood'§ well-reasoned analysis. In urging this Court to adopt a 
different state constitutional analysis, defendant cites to several cases in which other 
jurisdictions have rejected Youngbloodunder their state constitutions. Defendant views those 
decisions as fairer and less draconian than Youngblood's bad faith test. Br. Aplt. 45-50. 
Defendant's argument, however, ignores the sound policy considerations underlying 
Youngblood and the many jurisdictions that have embraced the bad faith requirement under 
their state constitutions. 
Ten states follow Youngblood, It is fitting that the Arizona Supreme Court was one 
of the first to expressly adopt Youngblood's bad faith requirement under its own constitution. 
It did so on remand from the United States Supreme Court. See State v. Youngblood, 844 
P.2d 1152, 1156-58 (Ariz. 1993). In so doing, the court explained why the rule announced 
in Youngblood was fundamentally fair. 
The court first explained why Brady violations and unpreserved evidence are treated 
differently. Under Brady, '"the suppression by the prosecution of [material] evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates [federal] due process . . . irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."5 Youngblood, 844 P.2d at 1156 (alterations in 
original). This "makes sense" because constitutionally material "[e]xculpatory evidence 
matters whether the police exercise good faith or bad faith in failing to produce it." Id. In 
such cases, the "defendant is prejudiced by definition because the unproduced evidence is 
plainly exculpatory." Id. The remedy for a Brady violation, however, is not a dismissal, but 
a new trial at which the evidence is available. Id. 
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"In stark contrast to Brady" unpreserved evidence "is neither plainly exculpatory nor 
inculpatory." Id, "Under these circumstances, one can only say that the evidence might have 
been exculpatory, or the evidence might have been inculpatory." Id, Thus, unlike Brady 
material "there is no showing of prejudice in fact."16 Id, 
In Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court held "that for this class of evidence, 
the good or bad faith of the state is relevant because of an inference that can be drawn from 
the bad faith of the police." Id. "A conscious, intentional or malicious failure to preserve 
evidence which could be tested suggests 'that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating 
the defendant.'" Id, (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). But in the Brady context, good 
or bad faith does not matter "because by definition Brady materials are plainly exculpatory 
and no inference is required." Id. 
As the Arizona Supreme Court noted, the Youngblood rule promotes fundamental 
fairness. "When the state exhibits bad faith in the handling of critical evidence, it is 
fundamentally unfair to allow the trial to proceed." Id. at 1157. In that case, the "remedy is 
to tell the state it will not be allowed to prosecute the case." Id. In addition, "[b]ad faith 
strengthens the inference that the evidence might be exculpatory to an unacceptable level." 
Id. But "where there is no bad faith, it is fundamentally unfair to bar the state from [the] 
courts." Id. Absent a showing of bad faith, the "inference that the evidence may be 
16This circumstance is, of course, distinguishable from that mentioned in 
Trombetta, where a defendant may be able to show that destroyed evidence was 
constitutionally material. The defendant need not show bad faith in that context. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. 
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exculpatory is not strong enough to dismiss the case." Id. Indeed, given that "a Brady 
violation results only in a new trial, it would be bizarre to suggest that, because of a non-
malignant fortuity, fundamental fairness would require the dismissal of the charges." Id. In 
other words, the mere "possibility of prejudice is not"— nor should it be—"sufficient to 
justify the ultimate sanction-an order of dismissal."17 Id. 
Seven states do not follow Youngblood. Defendant urges this Court to follow those 
states that have rejected Youngblood's "litmus test of one factor" in favor of a balancing test 
that considers several factors, including the good or bad faith of the police. Br. Aplt. 46-47. 
As a preliminary matter, Youngblood does not have a litmus test of one factor. As explained, 
the threshold question under federal due process is whether the lost or destroyed evidence 
is constitutionally material or only "potentially useful." See Fisher, 540 U.S. 545, 548. If 
17The nine other jurisdictions adopting the bad faith requirement under their state 
constitutions are: People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 886 (Cal. 1991) (rejecting express 
request to not follow Trombetta, and implicit request to not follow Youngblood on state 
law grounds, and holding that "[t]he reasons that caused [the court] to adopt Trombetta in 
[a previous holding] apply also to Youngblood")] People v. Pecoraro, 677 N.E.2d 875, 
887 (111. 1997) (adhering to "well-reasoned principles set forth in Trombetta and 
Youngblood for purposes of. . . state due process clause"); State v. Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d 
787, 792 (Iowa 1992) (recognizing state's previous adoption of Youngbloodunder Iowa 
constitutional law); State v. Finley, 42 P.3d 723, 728 (Kan. 2002) (considering and 
rejecting argument to grant accused any more due process rights under state constitution); 
Collins v. Commw., 951 S.W.2d 569, 572-73 (Ky. 1997) (expressly adopting Youngblood 
in its state constitutional analysis); State v. Anderson, 724 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Me. 1999) 
(state due process clause provides no more rights than those found in federal due process 
clause); Patterson v. State, 741 A.2d 1119, 1128-29 (Md. 1999) (reiterating that Maryland 
follows United States Supreme Court in interpreting state due process clause); State v. 
Drdak, 411 S.E.2d 604, 608 (N.C. 1992) (citing Youngblood and adopting its test under 
state constitution); State v. Greenwold, 525 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Wis. App. 1994) (holding 
that Wisconsin and federal due process protections are identical), rev. den W, 531 N.W.2d 
329 (Wis. 1995). 
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the defendant can show that the evidence is constitutionally material—exculpatory and 
unique—he is entitled to either suppression or dismissal depending on the importance of the 
evidence. This, as in Brady material, is the result irrespective of the intent of the police. See 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89. Youngblood's bad faith requirement arises only when the 
evidence mightbe exculpatory, i.e., potentially useful. As explained, that requirement makes 
perfect sense in this context because, absent an inference arising from police bad faith, any 
prejudice to defendant is, at best, speculative. 
Defendant urges this Court to adopt Delaware's balancing test from Hammond v. 
State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989). See Br. Aplt. 47. Hammondpresents a complicated formula. 
It first requires the court to determine whether the evidence would have been subject to 
disclosure under state discovery rules or Brady. Hammond, 569 A.2d at 88. If so, the court 
must then evaluate the State's duty to preserve discoverable evidence. Id. If the court finds 
such a duty, it must then balance three factors: (1) "the degree of negligence or bad faith 
involved," id. at 88-89; (2) "the importance of the missing evidence and the reliability of the 
secondary or substitute evidence that remains available," id. at 89; and (3) "an examination 
of the sufficiency of the evidence, which the State presented at trial," id. at 90. 
While a balancing test like Hammond's may have superficial appeal, it offers no 
improvement over Trombetta and Youngblood. Indeed, its practical application is 
problematic, particularly in the pre-trial stages. First, two of the three Hammond factors are 
those considered in both Trombetta and Youngblood—materiality, the availability of 
alternative evidence, and the bad faith of the police. Hammond adds to the mix a comparison 
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of the unpreserved evidence to the evidence ultimately presented at trial. But as a practical 
matter, this third factor is merely another assessment of the materiality of the missing 
evidence or prejudice suffered by defendant. Second, Hammond offers no guidance on how 
much weight should be given to each factor or how they should be balanced. Finally, it is 
impossible under Hammond to assess the sufficiency of the evidence until after trial, and all 
the evidence has been presented. 
Given the foregoing, defendant has not shown that the Trombetta/Youngblood 
standards do not adequately protect his state due process rights or that the Hammond 
balancing test is superior. 
E. Defendant has shown no state constitutional violation in any case. 
But even assuming that there might be a case in which a separate state constitutional 
analysis would be appropriate, this is not such a case. As explained above, the destroyed 
evidenced in this case is not even potentially exculpatory or useful to the defendant. To the 
extent that it might have some value to defendant, there appears to be comparable available 
evidence. Finally, a dismissal of the case at this stage is premature, even under defendant's 
authorities, where all the available evidence has not yet been developed nor presented to the 
trier of fact. Until that time, it is impossible to fully assess the materiality of the destroyed 
evidence or its prejudicial affect on defendant's ability to present a defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the trial court's rulings. 
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Addendum A 
ADDENDUM A 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2 [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.} 
pointment.] 5. [Power to-enforce amendment.! 
3. [Disqualification to hold office ] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Addendum B 
ADDENDUM B 
Police Property Tracking Tags 
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F ' ....-w ;;?i, i-jie LI.U _ ^ :.-.-ective Ron Edwards, 
- ;-st Valley Police Dep:- . . ~v, . Td Spann with the West 
I ley Police Department. : have tc read you your rights per 
./-rand?-. T ~; y: i understand that? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: You hav3 o:.o r^ ..:. ^  ^ ^., o x . c . ^.y^u.::^ ^ . u say can-and 
will be used against you in a court of law. You have the 
right to have a lawyer present before any questioning. Do you 
ET: inaudible 
RE: ^w yc„ u n d e r s t a n d t h a t you can .MUM i 11 * ~. «\\iesi i * in I mi 11 
a n y t i m e ? 
ET: Ya. 
i- JM ii you cannot afford an attorney/ we will provide one for you. 
Do you unde^^t-.^rr! i-v*~+-? 
L T i Y a . . . - •; . "•;•' ."' 
RE: 0:i you still wish to speak to us at this ti me? 
I l 
HE: Are you i n t o x i c a t e d ? 
FT: Ti t o l u e n e . 
I I Uli.it' J t o l u e n e ? 
ETi T o l u e n e . 11 " c, i t ! s a paint thinner. 
H i ; 1" * , i ] i I  in ml t h i n n e r ? 
ET: T i , 
RF: wkay, do you know why we! re ---- • ? 
E T • ! ! , ' • 
RE I What are we going to talk to you about? 
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ET: The murders out there. 
RE: What murders? 
ET: The murders out there at West Valley. 
RE: Who are they? 
ET: Suzie, Chuck and Scotty. 
RE: Whose Suzie? 
ET: She's the woman I love. 
RE: That you love? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: What happened to her? 
ET: I don't want to talk about it. 
RE: You don't want to talk about it? 
ET: No. 
ES: Edgar? 
ET: What. 
ES: Why don't you want to talk about it? 
ET: I love that woman so much. 
ES: What is it that you don't want to talk about? You said 
murders in West Valley, where in West Valley? 
ET: .... inaudible....Hummingbird Street. 
ES: I'm sorry, where? 
ET: 13 08 Hummingbird Street. 
ES: 1308 Hummingbird, who lives there? 
ET: Me. 
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RE: Who II /es wi tli you ? 
ET: Suzie and Scotty and they just moved in last ni-v* JL donft 
.know. 
RE: Okay, what don't you want to talk about? Edgar? What don't 
you want to talk about, Ed? 
ES: Edgar, we're not going to force you talk about anything. 
We're asking you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you 
can answers this questions, not answer that question, answer 
this question, not answer that question. Ycu don't have to 
answer any of our questions at all.. You can stop at anytime.. 
ET: 01; ay. 
ES: He made that clear to yoi i, right? 
ET: Ya. . 
E.'" ^ - ---I sua^a j-^ u *ct...-.::u uo talk to us, wnat part do you 
< vrv^ t part don't- vou want to talk to us about? 
P- - cio you remember me reading you're rights earlier and you 
no a waiver for r^ t ^  search your hnmp^ 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Okay, we_were called t o ;:r oi :i r home on a gunshot. ' We got in 
there and seen some people.• Who 'shot them? 
ET: Me. 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Whv :~ : -—. shooc them? 
ET: : .. ~o .^^ _.o cause 1 1 o\ e her and I shot the other two 
RE: Why \.: ; r\, --; Chuck for? 
th' a iriLi ii: • i\ =a: 
RE: Gkay ;\z. :a i eora ge t, come into the picture? 
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ET: I was going to shoot her too but she was pregnant. 
RE: Okay, why? Why did you shoot them? 
ET: I shot Suzie cause I love her, I love her so much. 
RE: Was she going to leave you? 
ET: No. She wouldn't. 
RE: If you loved her that much, there's a reason why you shot her. 
Could you please explain why you shot her? 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
ES 
ET 
I don't know. 
Okay. What time did you shoot them? 
I don't know. 
Was it daylight? 
I don't know. 
How long have you been sniffing that solvent? 
Since 1962. 
Tonight how long? Or today? 
All day. 
Do you know what today's date is? 
You told me but I don't remember. 
Do you know what day of the week it is? 
No. 
What was yesterday? 
I don't have any idea. 
Do you work Edgar? 
No, I'm on SSI. 
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r.. : Social Security Supplemental Income. 
p - . ^ v 3 V . v-"u *->•-/- ~* : u n c j i a y O U i : r :? 
RE* V m t d: ^ cu -h:cr Suzie with? 
Rl. nii- dti ,T?u sh-c4- Yartin with? 
ET i Wh' ^ ~ *" " *" y 
~> 
ET ; U ~:, th at ' s Scctry. 
RE: Is that Scotty? 
ET: Ya. ' 
RE: That was sleeping on the floor? 
RE; -jr:ay, what did you shoot him with? 
ET::" I cl : • :n. 't know. 
RE: Wh i t d i cl y o u s h o o t C1 m c J : % i 11 L ? 
ET: .38. 
RE: How many t:i m e s :i :i :i y : I i ; 1 i : • : I:: Clin i :;] ;::? 
ET: Twice. 
RE: Where at? 
ET: The fhr o 'it. 
RE: And wherry else? 
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ET: I didnft see where the other place was. 
RE: Was he trying to get out of the bed? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Who did you shoot first? 
ET: Suzie. 
RE: Then what happened? Did Scott wake up? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: So they were all asleep? 
ET: Ya. No they was both awake. 
RE: They were both awake talking to you? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Where were the guns at when you decided to shoot them? 
ET: My hands. 
RE: Where were the guns at before you picked up the guns? Where 
did you go get the guns from? 
ET: I picked, got them out of my room. 
RE: Is yours the bedroom way in the back? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Okay. You took them out of that bedroom? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Was Chuck asleep? 
ET: I think so. 
RE: Okay. When you got the. guns, where were, were they already 
loaded or did you have to load them? 
TAPED INTERVIEW 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN 
NOVEMBER 2, 1 9 9] 
91-20773 
PAGE 7 
ET: They were already loaded. 
RE; Tc you always carry loaded guns x^ 
RE: What kind cf jar do you own? 
ETi 1^1 , 
RE: Okay, u^
 ;-r: kr.ov vh.-t •'-h-t licer.se plate number is? 
ET: '. , ah ?-!^-* : ^ :-"«-
FE: Ok.ly _ _*.,_« ; u - _ ? 
ET: Ah, since November cf 19 3 0 . 
RE: Whose "' - -1 * V -- - v--'• ' ' ' 
KT: TJUII'L . nought: . > L^I iv.. r. 
RE: Okay, whose 
i 1 1 ' " > I 1; i p t i r e i . I J L , " . 
RE: She d i d n ' t ? 
ES: How lonq hav n you and Suzie been toq<--ther? 
I I "I housandj cL years. 
RE: Does Suzie work? • 
ET: She "'s n prosti ti ite. 
ES: What•s uuzie's last name? 
ET: Sessions. 
1 1 E: Is si le . i , . . . 
ET: She shoots heroin. Tha t!s why she has to stupid work, 
ES: Do you d :> dr \ igs a 3 so Edga r? 
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ET: No, I don't do, I used to do it. I done it with her for about 
two or three, I mean two or three days and it didn't even 
effect me or anything. I know I didn't, couldn't even get 
off, just got back to toluene. 
RE: So why did you have to shoot Suzie? 
ET; I don't know, I don't know. 
ES: Does Suzie usually sleep in the bedroom with you or does she 
sleep on the couch? 
ET: No, no, she just moved in. She's... 
RE: How long have you known Suzie? 
ET: About 10 years. 
RE: And how long has she moved in with you? 
ET: She moved in about, she lived out there in Rose Park for about 
two or three months after my mom died and she got an apartment 
of her own and then. 
RE: How old are you Edgar? 
ET: 45. 
RE: How long have you been on Social Security? 
ET: Since November of 88. 
RE: Where did you work at before you went on Social Security? 
ET: I don't remember. 
RE; Do you have any physical impairments? Any physical injuries? 
ET: I had a stroke. I couldn't get out of my room for three days. 
I couldn't talk for seven. I was in the hospital for two and 
a half months. 
RE: You said you had a stroke? 
ET: Ya. 
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K I1! I lvu"rt i. C i J i—(' a .J G ? 
ET; ... inaudible. . .it was 1980, I mean 1988, November of 1988. 
The papers are i n the trailer, 
RE: Okay, Is there any mental problems? 
ET: Ya. A ] ] k:i nds. 
RE: What k i n d of m e n t a l p r o b l e m s ? 
ET: See , I t h i n k I ' m Adolf H i t l e r , . Adolf H i t l e r d i e d i n May of 
5 and I was "born i n 19 , Oc tober 194 6, I t h :i nk I 1 in Ade 1 f 
l e x . 
ES: Edgar, was Suzie your girlfriend? 
FT: Ya, 1 loved her more than anything else In this world. 
ii»o : D i d b U u IL" 1 I.I 4 i.. j i 'I! " ' 
ET: 1 don'l^ I don't know, T T don't think so. I don!t think she 
did. 
ES: . Well you've know her off and on for ten years and... 
F T : '£• 
ES: Is she living in your mom's house In Rose Park? 
ET: Ya. 
ES i Dl I i c i I ] I G \ a I: \ : i ri : rii : ;: • i 1 3 1: ioi ise :i i i I i : se Park? 
ES: ¥''•-- z' ' uu. move t? West Valley? 
ET: I :.:: 1 Q Q9 ^ r - . .) or 19 91 or whatever. • 
ES: When did she move out here in West Valley, just today, last 
night or night before or whatever, I don't know. 
RE: Where were her and her son staying before then? 
ET: Ah, 14 4• 5 Wes i: I D" 0 Nor tl i, Apartmen I: ; :: 
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RE: Why did they move out to you? 
ET: Cause they got kicked out of their apartments. 
RE: Why? 
ET: They, I don't know why, they just did, I don't know. 
RE: Who's Chuck? 
ET: She's Debbie's boyfriend. That's..,. 
RE: When did he get in town? 
ET: I think he came in a couple of three days ago. 
RE: Where's Debbie living? 
ET: With Suzie. 
RE; So she was staying in that house too? 
ET: Ya, 
RE: Trailer? 
ET; Ya. 
RE; So Chuck got here and he was staying in that back bedroom too? 
ET: I guess, I don't know. 
RE: When you shot him, is that the bedroom he was.... 
ET: Ya-
RE: And you did shoot him? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Why did you shoot him? 
ET: I don't know. I don't know. Just..-. 
RE: I want you to think about this, Edgar. You shot Suzie first 
with the .22. 
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ET: Ya. 
RE: Then you shot Scotty. 
ET: Ya. 
RE: You went in the bedroom to shoot Chuck? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Tell me, describe what happened as you ah, did you turn on the 
light? 
ET: No. 
RE; Could you see him pretty good? 
ET: I couldn't, I couldn't, I, I was, I just, I couldn't even see. 
I couldn't see him, I just, actually I couldn't even see any 
of them. 
RE: You said that you shot him in the throat. 
ET: I'm just a lucky shot. 
RE; Well you said you shot him in the throat, and how would you 
know you shot him in the throat if you couldn't see him. 
ET: Ah, afterwards I turned on the light. 
RE: Did you ever turn the light back off? 
ET: Ya, I turned it off about six or seven times, maybe more than 
that. 
RE: How many times did you shoot Chuck? 
ET: Twice. 
RE: Why did you shoot him the second time? 
ET: I just popped off two rounds. 
RE: Did you have a .38 or a .357? 
ET: .38. 
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ES: How many times did you shoot Scotty? 
ET: I don't know, about four I guess I don't know, at least he 
claims. 
RE: Who claims? 
ET: Scotty. 
RE: When did you talk to Scotty? 
ET: He was still alive. 
RE; He was still alive? 
ET; Ya. 
RE: Why didn't you shoot him again? 
ET: I just couldn't handle it. 
RE: After you shot everybody, was the lights on in the trailer? 
ET: No, they was all off. One, the one light, the one back 
bedroom light was on. 
RE: That was your bedroom? 
ET: Ya, no the one this one. 
RE: The one Chuck was in? 
ET: No, the one in the hall. 
RE; Oh, the hall light? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Okay, Edgar what we'd like to do is kind of start back in the 
evening and tell us what happened. What time did they move 
into your house. 
ET: I don't remember? 
ES: Yesterday? 
TAPED INTERVIEW 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN 
NOVEMBER 2, 1991 
91-20773 
PAGE 13 
ET; I think so, 
ES: Do you know what day of the week it was? 
ET: I don't have any idea. 
RE: Was it night time when they moved in or day light? 
ET; I don't even know. 
RE: Was everybody doing heroin in the house or was they just 
sniffing with you? 
ET: No, Suzie and them and Debbie were using heroin and ah Scotty 
was straight and, and ah, Chuck was drunk. I don't know if he 
was intoxicated or what. 
RE: But he'd been drinking? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Everybody went to bed. What did you do? 
ET: I just laid there and thought. 
RE; Where at? 
ET: My bedroom. 
RE; All by yourself? 
ET; Ya. 
RE; What did you think about? 
ET: I don't know what. I love everyone. 
RE: When you was in the back bedroom, Edgar, with the gun, why did 
you have to go out and shoot them? 
ET: I don't have any idea. 
RE: Did you hear any voices? 
ET: I think so. I don't know. 
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RE: Who was telling you to go shoot them? 
ET: The devil. 
RE; Are you a christian man? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Do you go to church? 
ET: Ya, I got to.. .inaudible. . .don't go to church, but I became an 
L.D.S. person. I smoke and drink. 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
You was sitting in your back bedroom, where was Debbie at? 
She was in the second bedroom. 
With Chuck? 
Ya. 
You walked down the hall? 
Ah-huh. 
Was the TV on? 
No. 
Radio on? 
No. 
What happened? Was the lights on? 
No. I had the one light on in the hallway. 
Okay, you walked in.... 
... inaudible...was dim. 
Okay, you walked down.... 
Ya. 
...your's standing over Suzie, what happened? 
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ET: I don't know what happened. I can't figure it out. I 
just.... 
RE: Was the sheet over her head? Or blanket over her head? 
ET: No. 
RE; Did you see her face? 
ET: Just barely. 
RE; Was her eyes open? 
ET: Ya, I don't know, I couldn't tell if her eyes were open or 
not, I think she was talking about something, I don't know. 
ES 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
Who was she talking to? 
Me. 
Was she pleading for her life? 
No. 
Did she see the gun? 
No. 
She didn't see the gun at all? 
No. 
What did you say to her before you shot her? 
I don't know. 
What did you say after you shot her? 
Nothing. 
Did she move? 
No. 
After you shot her, what did Scotty do? 
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ET: He got up and flipped, flipped over the covers and then I shot 
him. 
RE: Where did you shoot him at? 
ET: I don't know, in the stomach or, I mean in the arms and stuff 
like that. I don't know, I couldn't see very good 
. . .inaudible. . . I just pumped about, I think I pumped two .22 
shells into him and two .,3 8 shells into him. 
RE: What side of the mattress was you standing when you shot him? 
The kitchen side or the bedroom side of the mattress? 
ET: Bedroom side. 
RE; So how far away from you, how far away was Suzie when you shot 
her? 
ET: Ah, there's a coffee table on the end so, I guess from the 
coffee table to there. 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
RE 
Did you aim? 
No, I only pulled the trigger. 
Just one time? 
Ya. 
And it was a lucky shot? 
Ya. 
I don't believe you. 
I don't know, I was just... 
Were you angry with Suzie? 
Ya. 
What were you angry at her for? 
Cause she ripped me off of six or seven thousand dollars. 
How did she rip you off? 
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ET: Well, I bought her that car for eight hundred. She was going 
to get her husband sent to prison and she bought coke, I mean 
heroin with a thousand dollars and then I got her out of jail 
one time and she wasn't even in jail and that was three 
hundred dollars, she got this ticket, Lee what's his name, Lee 
Ward and Debbie Lee and they split it up and shot it up in 
heroin and then ah, I got her, I got her an abortion and I 
found out she'd been fixed, I knew she'd been fixed but I 
mean, she didn't appreciate anything. 
RE: If you knew all this, why did you let her move in with you? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: If you knew that she ripped you off of that money, did you 
ever ask her to pay you back? 
ET: No. 
ES: What were you hoping to gain by it? 
ET: I wanted to marry her. She kept promising me she was going to 
marry me, marry me, marry me. 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
Was you having a sexual relationship with her? 
Ya. 
How many, you said that she was a prostitute? 
Ya. 
How often did she go out on the streets? 
I don't know. 
Who was her pimp? 
I think it was Lee Ward. 
Lee Ward? 
Ya. 
Who's that? 
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ET: A Niger. 
RE: Where does he live? 
ET: I don't know his exact address, somewhere in 13th South, 
between 13th South and 7th West or something like that. 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
Have you ever met him? 
Ya. 
Did he know that she was living with you? 
I think so. 
What's your phone number in your house? 
It was, ah, 263-8853, but I had it disconnected. 
Why? 
Cause I didn't trust them people. 
What people? 
Chuck and them other peoples and stuff. 
When did you have it disconnected? 
Huh? 
When did you have it disconnected? 
The day they move in. 
Yesterday? 
Ya. 
How far away were you from Scott when you shot Scott? 
I was standing in the same place where I shot Suzie. 
Then you walked down the hall? 
Ya. 
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RE: Tell me? 
ET: I walked down the hall and I shot four rounds. 
RE: Was you shooting your right hand or left hand? 
ET: I had them in both hands. I had my .22 in my left hand and my 
.38 in my left, my right hand. 
RE: Are you right handed or left handed? 
ET: Right handed. 
ES: You had your .22 in the left hand and your .38 in the right? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: After you shot him 
ET: I felt terrible. 
RE: ...what did you do then? 
ET: I felt terrible. 
RE: I understand that, but what did you do then? After you shot 
Chuck what did you do? 
ET: I'm not sure. I laid down, I don't know what happened then. 
It was all a blur. 
RE: What did you say to Debbie? 
ET: I talked to her for about two or three hours. 
RE: Where at? 
ET: I don't know. I talked to her for several, I don't know. 
ES: You say Scotty was still alive? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What was Scotty doing? 
ET: Laying there moaning. 
TAPED INTERVIEW 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN 
NOVEMBER 2, 1991 
91-20773 
PAGE 20 
ES: How long? 
ET: All day. 
RE: Did Suzie have AIDS? 
ET: I don't think so, I don't know, I don't know. I mean I could, 
I think I got it, I don't know if I got it or what, I don't, 
that's not important. 
RE: What's that? 
ET: That's not important. 
RE: Okay. Where did you go after you left your house? 
ET: Went to get some heroin. 
RE: For who? 
ET: Debbie. 
RE: Why her? 
ET: I don't know, I wanted to get some cocaine. 
ES: For who? 
ET: I don't know, from Tony or something like that, I don't know 
their names ..inaudible... 
ES: Was that for you or for him? For you or for Debbie? 
ET: I wanted the heroin for Debbie and the cocaine for me. 
RE: How much money did you have on you? 
ET: I didn't have any money. 
ES: Who had money then? 
ET: Debbie. 
RE: Did Debbie know you was going to kill these people? 
ET: No. 
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RE: How long did you ride around with Debbie? 
ET: Well, I'd say about an hour or two, I don't know how long. 
ES: ^  ... inaudible...drugs? 
ET: No. I found a piece in Suzie's coat pocket, here, a piece of 
heroin. 
RE: Is that Suzie's jacket? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Whose idea was it to go get drugs? 
ET: Debbie's? 
RE: Why didn't you shoot Debbie there? 
ET: I couldn't fucking handle it, I came to my senses. I don't 
know why.... 
ES: If you came to your senses, how come you didn't call somebody 
to help Scotty? 
ET: I don't know. I don't know if I came to my senses or not. 
ES: How old is Scotty? 
ET: I think he's 15. 
ES: How old's Suzie? 
ET: I think she's 33. 
RE: How old's Debbie? 
ET: I think she's 37. I think Chuck's 44. 
ES: Anything happy between you and Debbie? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What happened? 
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ET: Um, Debbie and Suzie would take turn sitting on my face and 
fucking me, 
ES: When? 
ET: Oh, a couple of times or I don't know. 
RE: Last night? 
ET: Ah, I don't know. 
RE: Did you have ah, have sex with Debbie today? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Where at? 
ET: The front room, I mean on the hall. 
RE: After you shot them? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: After you shot Suzie, Scott and Chuck, you took Debbie in the 
hallway and did she submit to you or did you rape her? 
ET: She submitted to me. 
RE: What, how did it happen? What did you say to her? 
ET: Well I had her wash her pussy out real good and I ate her out 
and then I fucked her. 
ES: Did she say anything to you? 
RE: Did she want it? 
ET: Ya, I think so. 
RE: What did she say? 
ET: She said it was real enjoyable. 
RE: When did she tell you that? 
ET: Just after we did it. 
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ES: Did you have your guns with you still? 
ET: I laid them down on the floor, 
ES: Did you have your guns with you when you made her clean 
herself? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Where was sure when you told her to get up and clean herself? 
ET: What's this? 
ES: How did this come about? You Scott, you shot Chuck, how did 
you come to talk with Debbie? What did she do? 
ET: What do you mean, what did she do. 
ES: After you shot Chuck, what did she do? She was in bed with 
him, is that correct? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: So what does she do? 
ET: Not much, she came up and we talked for a while. 
RE: What did you talk about? 
ET: How much I loved Suzie. 
RE: Did she know that you just shot Suzie and Scott? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Was she crying? 
ET: No. She had a horrified look on her face. I think it's just 
from the heroin. 
RE: After you brought her out of the bedroom, you talked for a 
while in the hallway? 
ET: No, she sat down on the couch and we talked for about two or 
three hours. 
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ES: On the couch next to Suzie? 
ET: No on the other couch. 
ES: What was Scott doing all this time? 
ET: Moaning. 
ES: So you talked for two or three hours and you had her get up 
and go to the bathroom? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Did you go into the bathroom with her? 
ET: No, I just stood out in the hall. I left the door open. 
ES: Then what happened? Is that when you performed oral sex on 
her? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: What was she wearing? 
ET: Ah, a yell, I mean a white terry cloth towel, or a terry cloth 
robe or whatever it is. 
RE: Any panties? 
ET: No. 
RE: Bra? 
ET: No. 
ES: Was she wearing any clothes when she was in bed with Chuck? 
ET: No. 
RE: Why didn't you go back in your bedroom? Edgar? Why didn't 
you take Debbie back into her bedroom? Back into your 
bedroom? 
?JT: I don't know, I just, I didn't think Suzie was dead. 
RE: Okay. Suzie was sleeping on the couch. 
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ET: Ya. 
RE: Scott's sleeping on the floor. How come Suzie's not sleeping 
in your bedroom with you? 
ET: She wouldn't do it. 
RE: She'd make love to you but she wouldn't sleep with you? 
ET: No. 
ES: Did you have intercourse with her that night? 
ET: No. 
ES: When was the last time you had intercourse with Suzie? 
ET: Two or three days ago. Me and, me and Debbie and Suzie did, 
I ate Suzie's pussy and Debbie was sitting on my dick. 
RE: Do you always have a threesome? 
ET: Ya. Well most, a lot of times just Suzie. I like just Suzie 
the best. 
RE: Why? 
ET: Cause I love her. 
ES: Do you tell her that? 
ET: Every fucking day and night. 
ES: What does she say? 
ET: She didn't seem to say nothing? 
ES: Did she laugh at you? 
ET: I don't know what she did. She just.... 
ES: Did she laugh at you? 
ET: No, I don't think she, I don't know if she did or what. She 
just.... 
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RE: What did she say tonight or today that made you angry enough 
to shoot her? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: What did she do to make you angered, that angered you? 
ET: I don't know, I have no idea, just..... 
ES: What made you have sexual relations with her sister after you 
shot her? 
ET: I don't know what that was. I guess I was just horny, I don't 
know. 
RE: Shooting those people get you excited? 
ET: No. 
RE: Did you have an erection after you shot them? 
ET: No. 
ES: When did you get the erection? 
ET: When I was eating Suzie out, I mean Debbie out. 
ES: Did you ever have a sexual relationship prior to police 
officer finding you? 
ET: Huh? 
ES: Did you have sex with her anymore prior to the police catching 
you? After you left your trailer? 
ET: No. 
ES: Where did you go? 
ET: We went to score some dope. 
RE: Who was driving? 
ET: Debbie. 
ES: What vehicle? 
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ET: Chuck's truck, I mean Chuck's car. 
RE: What kind of car is it? 
ET: I don't know, it's an Oldsmobile I think or something like 
that. 
RE: Is them the clothes you was wearing last night? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: And the same clothes you had on after you had sex with Debbie? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What were you wearing when you shot Suzie? 
ET: These clothes here. 
ES: So you were fully dressed? 
ET: Ya, except for this jacket here. This jacket here we, I mean, 
we picked it off, I mean it was on, all I had to do was, a 
jacket, two jackets, I picked this one here. 
RE: Why did you pick that one? 
ET: She got the other one, Debbie got the other one. 
RE: Why didn't you grab your jacket? Why did you grab Debbie's? 
I mean Suzie's. 
ET: ... inaudible... 
RE: Okay. 
ES: Did you get any dope? You said no right? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: Where all did you go? 
ET: I don't know. ...inaudible... 
ES: How many places did you go? 
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ET: We just kept driving around and looking for the dope, I mean 
calling places. I couldn't get the phone numbers. 
ES: What was Debbie saying? 
ET: Huh? 
ES: What was Debbie saying? 
ET: Saying? 
ES: What did she say? How did you guys decide to go ahead and go? 
Whose idea was that? 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
RE 
Hers. 
She asked you to call medical? 
No, no. 
She asked you to call for help? 
No. 
Was Scotty still sitting there, laying there moaning? 
Ya. 
Was he moaning when you left? 
I think so. 
Which door did you go out of? 
That door. 
Did you leave it unlocked or did you lock it? 
I locked it I think. 
How does it lock? 
Just push the button in. 
Was the front door already locked? 
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ET: Ya. 
RE: What did Debbie say to you while you was riding around? 
ET: Well she said that we could go back and get it on and.... 
RE: And what else? 
ET: I don't know just. 
RE: Edgar? 
ET: Huh? 
RE: I think it's time you start telling us the truth. 
ET: That's the truth. 
ES: Edgar? 
ET: What. 
ES: We think it's time you start telling us the truth. The whole 
truth. I think what you're saying is, is close, but I think 
there's some other things that you know that you're just not 
telling us. 
RE: I think you're fantasizing about a few things here and what 
we'd like you to do is tell us exactly what happened. 
Truthfully. 
ET: That's what happened. 
RE: Why did you shoot Suzie? 
ET: I loved her. 
RE: What happened that you got so angered that you went into the 
back bedroom, got a gun, walked up to the foot of the couch, 
pulled the weapon up to your eye, took aim and shot her in the 
head? 
ET: I didn't shoot her, I mean, I pulled it down like that, I just 
• « • 
RE: Show me again. 
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ET: Like that. 
RE: Stand up and show me, I can't.... 
ES: Stand up. Okay, I'm on the couch. Which hand did you have 
the gun that you shot Suzie with? 
ET: This one here. 
ES: That's your left hand, you had the .22? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: How many times did you squeeze the trigger? 
ET: Once. 
ES: What could you see? 
ET: I wasn't sure. 
RE: Is the .22 an automatic or a revolver? 
ET: An automatic. 
ES: ... inaudible.... 
ET: Huh? 
ES: ... inaudible...is that from the stroke? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Edgar, why did you shoot Suzie. If you loved her, you 
wouldn't have shot her. You've know her for ten years. 
You've talked to her before, you've been able to talk problems 
out before. What problem manifested itself tonight or today 
or last night that gave you the impulse to kill her? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: Something had to turn you, what turned you? 
ES: You say you were talking to her when you walked up and at the 
bottom of the couch. What was she saying to you? 
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ET: She was telling me I was disgusting. 
RE: Why? 
ET: I don't know. 
ES: Now tell us. 
RE: I'm going to talk to Debbie and Debbie's going to tell us her 
side of the story, so I want you to tell ya, tell us your side 
before we talk to her. 
ET: That is my side of the story. 
RE; Did you get that sexually aroused by killing those people that 
you.... 
ET: No. 
ES: Then why after killing the woman you love, do you have 
intercourse with her sister? 
ET: Cause I liked Debbie second. I love all women. 
RE: Edgar, start telling the truth. There's something that 
snapped in that trailer house, last night or early this 
morning that made you kill Suzie. 
ET: I don't know what happened. 
RE: It wasn't the devil. You didn't hear voices. What happened? 
ET: I don't know. 
ES: When she said that you were disgusting, when did she say that? 
ET: She said, she said I was disgusting. 
ES: What was happening before that? She sat on the couch and 
yelled down the hall? Is that disgusting? 
ET: No, she was laying there. She called me ...inaudible... 
RE: She called you what? 
ET: Tiede. 
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ES: Is that a nickname? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What did she say? 
ET: She said you were disgusting. 
ES: What had you done? 
ET; Nothing. 
ES: Was this when you had the guns in your hand or before? 
ET: I had the guns in my hand. 
ES: Okay, something had to have happened as you walked down the 
hall with two guns in your hand. Not one gun, two guns. 
Something had to got happened for you to come from your 
bedroom down the hall, two guns in your hand, point the gun at 
Debbie, at Suzie and take a shot. 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: After you shot Suzie, did you do anything else to her? 
ET: No, I covered her up. 
RE: With the blanket? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What was she wearing? 
ET: I donft know. 
RE: Did she have any blankets on her? 
ET: I think so, I don't know. 
RE: Or did you just cover her head up? 
ET: Her whole, her whole body. 
RE: So she was laying on the couch with any covers on her when you 
shot her? 
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ET: No, she was, she had covers down to her, down around here. 
RE: Down to her waist? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Did she have her bra on? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: Did she have clothing that covered her? 
ET: Ya. 
RE: Did she sit up when you shot her? 
ET: No. 
RE: She was laying down? 
ES: Edgar, did you ask her to come in the hall before you shot 
her? 
ET: No. 
ES: Had you asked her to come and sleep with you earlier? 
ET: Ya. 
ES: What did she say? 
ET: Just telling me I was disgusting. 
ES: How did this conversation begin. They're doing heroin, Debbie 
and Suzie are doing heroin, where are they doing their heroin? 
ET: Ah, sometimes my bathroom other times.... 
ES: Where were they doing it this time? 
ET: I think they was using the bathroom over there because I, 
seven, seven fifteen, fourth north and 740 East, Apartment C. 
ES: They were doing heroin before they got to your house? 
RE: Who with? 
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ET: I don't know. 
RE: With him? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: Is Debbie a prostitute, too? 
ET: I think so. 
ES: So you asked Suzie to sleep with you and she called you 
disgusting? 
ET 
ES 
ET 
ES 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
RE 
ET 
Ya, I guess so. 
Well no, is it true or not? 
I thinks it is. 
Okay, I'm just telling you what you told me. 
Ya. 
Edgar? 
Huh? 
Why did you shoot them? 
I don't know. 
Why did you shoot Scotty and Chuck then? 
I don't know. I just, I don't know. 
Have we made any threats to you during this interview? 
No. 
Have we promised you anything? 
No. 
Are you making this statement on your own free will? 
Ya. 
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RE: Is there anything else that you can tell us in your defense? 
Is there anything that you want to tell us to help us? 
ET: I don't want to make any appeals and I want to be put to death 
by lethal injection. 
RE: You know you're going to be charged with a capital homicide? 
ET: I know. 
RE: Why did you do it? 
ET: I don't know. 
RE: Are you under any influence of any other drugs or alcohol? 
ET: Just toluene. 
RE: How do you feel? 
ET: Lousy. 
RE: Okay, do you u n d e r s t a n d eve ry th ing I ' v e s a i d ? 
ET: Sometimes. 
RE: You've made a response to everything I've asked you, is that 
correct? 
ET: I think so. 
RE: Do you have anything else to say? 
ET: I'll think of something in a while, 
RE: Okay, we're going to conclude this interview, same date at 
3:00 PM\ 
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Trial Court's Ruling on Defendant's Confession 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 021912452 
vs. : 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Illegally Obtained Statements. The Motion raises three 
legal issues. First, whether defendant invoked his Miranda rights; 
second, whether defendant's confession was involuntary; and 
finally, whether defendant was competent during his interrogation. 
FACTS 
Detective Ron Edwards ("Det. Edwards") and Sergeant Ed Spann 
(MSgt. Spann") of the West Valley Police Department, began the 
interrogation of defendant, Edgar Tiedemann, on November 2, 1991, 
at 1:58 p.m. Det. Edwards began by asking the defendant to sign 
the paper placed before him and explained for the benefit of the 
camera and the defendant that defendant had received his Miranda 
rights and was not intoxicated. The defendant corrected Det. 
Edwards, stating that he was intoxicated on Toluene. Det. Edwards 
asked the defendant how long he had been intoxicated on Toluene and 
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the defendant responded, stating "since 1962." When asked if he 
was incapable of understanding or answering questions, the 
defendant responded, "Sometimes, I don't know." At this point, the 
tape stopped and started again at 2:13 p.m. 
Det. Edwards read the defendant his Miranda rights. The 
defendant said that he was intoxicated on Toluene and confirmed 
that he was willing to answer questions with the police and did so 
voluntarily. The defendant continued the interrogation with his 
head lowered, and he infrequently looked up into the camera. 
When Det. Edwards asked, "What happened to her (Suzie)?" the 
defendant said, "I don't want to talk about it." Immediately 
afterward, when asked, "What don't you want to talk about?" he 
remained silent. Immediately thereafter, when asked, "Who is 
Suzie?" he responded without delay, "The woman that I love." The 
defendant readily answered other questions throughout the 
interrogation, except when asked, "What happened to Suzie?" 
The defendant did not remember the day of the week even though 
Det. Edwards told him the date at the beginning of the interview, 
and he did not remember if the victims moved in his house during 
the day or night. The defendant did provide several complex 
answers during the interrogation, including the license number and 
make of his car, the year he had his stroke, the physical effects 
of his stroke and other detailed information. 
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When responding to Det. Edwards' question if he had any mental 
problems, the defendant said "Ya. All kinds. See, I think I'm 
Adolph Hitler. Adolph Hitler died in May of 1945 and I was born in 
19, October 194 6. I think I'm Adolph Hitler." When asked by Det. 
Edwards if he heard voices, the defendant stated, "I think so. I 
don't know." When asked by Det. Edwards who was telling him to 
shoot them, the defendant responded, "the devil." The defendant 
also responded that he was a religious person. 
The defendant's interview ended at 2:58 p.m., having lasted 
just under one hour. During the interview, he did not request a 
break, did not directly request to stop the interview or request to 
have an attorney present. 
ANALYSIS 
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.1" Colorado v. Connelly, 479 
U.S. 157, 163 (1986) . A defendant in custody has the right to 
remain silent, the right to have an attorney present and the right 
to stop an interrogation at any time. Miranda v. Arizona. 3 84 U.S. 
436 (1964). Under the Due Process Clause, "certain interrogation 
techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique 
characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a 
civilized system of justice that they must be condemned." Id. 
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"Voluntariness" is not the sole consideration when considering 
whether admission of a confession violates the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment. State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Utah 1999). 
"Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding 
that a confession is not "voluntary.1" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. 
Analysis of whether a confession is admissible must consider the 
"totality of circumstances" to determine if the confession was 
"made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of 
any sort." Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689 (1993). The 
"totality of the circumstances" takes into account "both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation." State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989). 
"Courts must consider such external factors as the duration of the 
interrogation, the persistence of the officers, police trickery, 
absence of family and counsel , and threats and promises made to the 
defendant by the officers." Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1013. 
"Courts must also consider such factors as the defendant's 
mental health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education, 
age, and familiarity with the judicial system." Id. at 1014. 
Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court states, "a defendant's mental 
condition is not in itself sufficient to make a confession 
involuntary." Id. The mental state of a defendant "is relevant to 
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the extent it made him more susceptible to mentally coercive police 
tactics." Id. 
The court sets forth objective and subjective factors that a 
court should consider when conducting a "totality of the 
circumstances" examination. Id. at 1015. Objective factors 
include police misrepresentation, the false friend technique, 
threats and promises and other factors such as "whether the 
defendant is subject to extended periods of incommunicado." Jd. at 
1015-1018. In explaining subjective factors, the court lists 
whether the interrogators deny any of the defendant's requests, 
whether the defendant had prior experience with the judicial 
system, whether the defendant was particularly vulnerable to 
psychological manipulation, or whether the defendant was more 
susceptible to stress and coercion than the average person. Id. at 
1019-1020. 
I. Violation of Miranda 
The defense argues the defendant affirmatively invoked his 
right to remain silent, and that right was violated when police 
detectives continued his interrogation. The defendant cites State 
v. Guiterrez, 864 P.2d 894, 897 (Utah App. 1993), to show that an 
effective initial waiver of the right to remain silent does not 
nullify a suspect's ability to subsequently invoke this right 
during the course of an interrogation. In Guiterrez, when the 
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defendant said, "I ain't going to say nothing," the Utah Court of 
Appeals found the defendant invoked his Miranda rights. id. In 
Guiterrez, with continued questions and the police interrogator's 
suggestion that he was only using self-defense, the defendant was 
provoked into a confession. Jd. Guiterrez is distinguishable 
because the interrogators were more forceful and suggestive in 
their questioning and the defendant was referring to the entire 
interview, not a particular question. 
Here, the defendant did not want to talk about the specific 
bodily harm to Suzie, but was otherwise cooperative and willing to 
talk to the interrogators. The defendant answered affirmatively 
that he understood his Miranda rights, he refused to answer 
questions regarding the bodily harm that was inflicted upon Suzie, 
but unhesitatingly answered all other questions. His purposeful 
silence lasted only a brief period of time and only to questions 
regarding bodily injury to Suzie. He did not indicate, at any 
time, that he wished to stop the interrogation. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant did not invoke 
his Miranda rights. Therefore, the Court need not reach the issue 
of whether the defendant's statements are still admissible for 
purposes of impeachment. 
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II. Involuntary Statements 
The defense argues that the defendant's statements were not 
made voluntarily, in violation of federal due process. In 
analyzing whether the defendant's confession is voluntary, the 
Court will address both the objective and subjective factors of the 
defendant's interrogation. 
a. Police Misrepresentation, False Friend Technique, Threats 
or Promises and Other Objective Factors 
The defense argues the defendant's interrogation was subject 
to police coercion due to questionable interrogation techniques. 
Specifically, the defense cites Rettenberger to show the use of 
false friend technique, mental coercion, the lack of presence of 
counsel, family or friends. 984 P. 2d at 1013. Rettenberger is 
clearly distinguishable in that the police coercion was much more 
extensive. Here, the interrogators did not make use of false 
statements or half-truths. They did not use the false friend 
technique by implying they were acting in the best interest of the 
defendant by the simple use of his first name. The detectives did 
not use any threats or promises to entice the defendant into a 
confession. The entire interrogation took place within one hour, 
and during the investigation the interrogators did not deny any 
special requests of the defendant. There is no evidence of any 
ethical misconduct by the police. In short, the record shows that 
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the detective!s interrogation was absent of suggestive and coercive 
techniques. The Court finds no reason to believe the interrogation 
method used techniques that were sufficient to render the 
defendant's confession involuntary. 
b. Subjective Factors That Make the Defendant More 
Susceptible to Manipulation 
Turning to a review of the subjective factors that may make 
the defendant more susceptible to manipulation is a more difficult 
process than reviewing for pclice misconduct. The defense argues 
that the defendant's diminished mental capacity, the influence of 
drugs, his references to Hitler and Satan, and his lack of verbal 
skills and ability to express himself deem the defendant incapable 
of a voluntary confession. 
The defendant's prolonged use of Toluene, the stroke he 
suffered in 1982, or a head injury received as a child might be the 
cause of his generalized cerebral damage resulting in severe 
impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q. (Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, p. 14.) The defendant's 
reference that he believes he is Adolph Hitler indicates that he 
knows Hitler is dead and he does not have an actual belief that he 
is Hitler. His reference to Satan telling him to commit the 
criminal act may also stem from his religious beliefs. "A 
perception of coercion flowing from the "voice of God1 is a matter 
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to which the Federal Constitution does not speak." Connelly, 479 
U.S. at 517. In reviewing defendant's interrogation it is evident 
he did not answer all questions intelligently. On the other hand, 
the defendant provided clear and detailed answers to many of the 
questions. 
III. Incompetent 
The defense argues that the defendant was incompetent, 
rendering him incapable of voluntarily and knowingly waiving his 
constitutional rights at the time of his interrogation. The 
defense cites Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960), where 
the Supreme Court held the defendant's confession involuntary and 
reversed the conviction. There the defendant had a long history of 
mental illness, was interrogated for eight to nine hours in a small 
room filled with police officers with no relatives or counsel 
present and his confession was written by a police officer. The 
court found that the defendant was "insane" before, during and 
after the robbery. At the time of the robbery he was absent 
without authorization from a mental ward, where he had been placed 
due to his Veteran1s Administration classification of 100% 
incompetence resulting from a diagnosis of "schizophrenic reactive, 
paranoid type." Id. at 201. The factors addressed by the court in 
Blackburn are not present in the instant case. Prior to his 
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interrogation, defendant had not been found incompetent or 
"insane," and similar coercive factors were absent. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
defendant's interrogation, including his treatment by the 
detectives and his mental state, the Court finds his confession did 
not violate his Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights and is 
admissible. The Motion to Suppress is denied. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 021912452 
vs. : 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Quash 
Count III, or, Alternatively, Motion to Amend Count III, and 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on Destruction of Exculpatory 
Evidence. This Court has reviewed the Memoranda of counsel and 
heard oral argument on these Motions. 
I, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH COUNT III, OR ALTERNATIVELY 
MOTION TO AMEND COUNT III 
Defendant argues that Count III of the Information, the count 
that alleges Murder of Scott Liam Bunnell, Jr., should be dismissed 
because the State failed to show probable cause at the preliminary 
hearing. At the preliminary hearing, Deborah Southerland Pryor 
testified that on the evening in question she was in the bedroom of 
defendant's trailer when he came in, shot several times into the 
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bedroom, closed the door and left. She heard several shots fired 
in the front room, and subsequently went out to the front room and 
observed Mr. Bunnell's injuries. In addition, the State submitted 
an autopsy by Dr. Edward Leis, completed after Mr. Bunnell's death 
in 2001. The autopsy concluded that Mr. Bunnell had died from 
complications of paraplegia caused by the gunshot wound inflicted 
by defendant. 
At a preliminary hearing "the prosecution must present 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense 
has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. 
Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (Ut^h 2001). At a preliminary hearing "the 
magistrate must view all evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the prosecution." State v. Hester, 3 P. 3d 725, 728 (Utah App. 
2 000) . This Court finds that evidence produced by the State at 
preliminary hearing was sufficient to bind over Count III. In the 
alternative, the defendant has moved the Court to amend Count III 
to Attempted Homicide. Having found that there is sufficient 
evidence to bind over Count III on the greater offense, the 
alternative Motion need not be addressed. Therefore, defendant's 
Motion is denied. 
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II, MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON DESTRUCTION OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
Defendant has moved this Court to dismiss the charges against 
him based on the State's "willful destruction of all potentially 
exculpatory evidence.'' 
Defendant argues that the destruction of the evidence is in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12, of the Utah 
Constitution. 
In 1991, defendant was charged with two counts of Aggravated 
Murder, one count of Attempted Aggravated Murder, one count of 
Aggravated Kidnapping, and one Count of Aggravated Sexual Assault. 
All charges were dismissed on June 11, 1992, after defendant was 
found incompetent to stand trial. After that time, numerous items, 
including handguns, ballistic evidence, "Code R" data, blood and 
tissue samples, gunshot residue tests, fingerprints, drugs and 
paraphernalia, and clothing and bedding items were destroyed. 
These items were destroyed sometime between 1993 and 1994. In 
2002, defendant was found competent to stand trial and charges were 
re-filed. Defendant is now charged with three counts of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder, all first degree felonies. 
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Under federal law, a defendant's due process rights are 
violated if evidence destroyed has "exculpatory value that was 
apparent before the evidence was destroyed and [is] of such nature 
that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by 
other reasonably available means." California v. Trombetta, 467 
U.S. 479, 489 (1984) . The destroyed evidence also must be 
material, and "the possibility that the [evidence] could have 
exculpated [defendant] if preserved or tested is not enough to 
satisfy the standard of constitutional materiality." Arizona v. 
Younablood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). If evidence is only 
potentially useful, defendant bears the burden to show that police 
acted in bad faith in not preserving the evidence. Icl. "Bad 
faith requires that a defendant prove more than mere negligence; a 
defendant must show that 'the police...by their conduct indicate 
that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the 
defendant.'" State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah App. 1988) 
(quoting Youngblood, at 109). 
Defendant asserts that "bad faith should be presumed in this 
case unless and until the government is able to offer an 
explanation for the destruction of this evidence." Defendant's 
Memorandum at pp. 6-7. Defendant misstates the legal requirement. 
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As stated infra, the burden is upon the defendant to show that the 
State acted in bad faith in destroying the aforementioned property. 
The defendant has failed to meet that burden. 
Defendant further argues that under the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 12, defendant is afforded a higher degree of 
protection than under the Federal Constitution. The State argues 
that defendant's argument lacks merit because Utah has adopted the 
United States Supreme Court's standard. This Court cannot find 
support for the State's argument. Both cases cited by the State in 
support, State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999), and State v. 
Holden, 964 P.2d 318 (Utah App. 1998), were based on the state 
courts adhering to federal precedent when issues are argued under 
the Federal Constitution. Defendant correctly notes that Utah 
appellate courts on occasion have been willing to consider a 
different interpretation of Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 
14, than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
addressing the matter of search and seizure. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated, "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a 
somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate 
method for insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the 
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federal courts." State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (1990), (quoting 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, at n.8 (Utah 1988)). 
In State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73, n. 5 (Utah App. 
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals suggested a three-prong analysis 
in determining whether the Utah Constitution should be interpreted 
differently from a similar provision in the United States 
Constitution. First, the moving party should analyze the "unique 
context in which Utah's Constitution developed", second, "should 
demonstrate the willingness of state appellate courts to regularly 
interpret textually similar state constitution provisions in a 
manner different from federal interpretation of'the United States 
Constitution, and that it is entirely proper to do so in the 
federal system," and third, the moving party should cite to "other 
states supporting the particular construction urged by counsel." 
Id. 
In the instant case, defendant has offered no analysis 
concerning the unique context in which Utah's Constitution 
developed, nor shown why this State's Constitution should be 
interpreted differently than the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution. 
STATE V. TIEDEMANN PAGE 7 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In addition, defendant has made reference to numerous cases in 
other state jurisdictions that have "rejected Youngblood". 
However, defendant has not articulated the rulings of other states 
correctly. For example, in State v. Morales , 657 A.2d 585, 594 
(Conn. 1995), the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded: 
That the good or bad faith of the police in failing to 
preserve potentially useful evidence cannot be 
dispositive of whether a criminal defendant has been 
deprived of due process of law. Accordingly, we, too, 
reject the litmus test of bad faith on the part of police 
which the United States Supreme Court adopted under the 
Federal Constitution and Youngblood. Rather, in 
determining whether a defendant has been afforded due 
process of law under the state constitution, the trial 
court must employ. .. [a] balancing test, weighing the 
reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against 
the degree of prejudice to the accused. More 
specifically, the trial court must balance the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding the missing evidence, 
including the following factors: The materiality of 
missing evidence, the likelihood of mistaken 
interpretation of it by witnesses or the jury, the reason 
for its nonavailability to the defense, and the prejudice 
to the defendant caused by the unavailability of the 
evidence. (Quoting State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227 
(1984)) . 
In the instant case, defendant has only urged this Court to 
reject the bad faith Youngblood standard, but he has not suggested 
a viable alternative standard. 
Because defendant has failed to offer a Utah Constitutional 
Dasis, nor a viable alternative to Youngblood based on the Utah 
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Constitution, this Court cannot appropriately address the 
constitutional issue. Therefore, this Court finds defendant's Utah 
Constitutional argument inadequate. 
Accordingly, having found no United States Constitutional 
basis nor Utah Constitutional basis to dismiss this case, 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon destruction of exculpatory 
evidence is denied. 
Dated this /f day of September, 2005. 
DISTRICT ta^Jyj^E/ 
